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SELF-ALTERING INJURY: THE HIDDEN HARMS
OF HEDONIC ADAPTATION
Sean Hannon Williamst
Several scholars have recently suggested that under one plausible mea-
sure of harm-the happiness of the victim-severe disabilities cause little or
no long-term harm. This is because victims adapt and recover much, if not
all, of their preinjury happiness. Yet most people have a powerful and en-
during intuition that severe injuries, like paraplegia, cause substantial
harm. Legal scholars have tried to salvage this intuitive notion of harm,
and they have turned to a single philosophical tradition to do so: the capabil-
ities approach. Unfortunately, this approach is likely to introduce contested
questions of value and can provide only an incomplete account of harm.
This Article offers an alternative defense that has substantial descriptive sup-
port in psychological studies and disability research. The core of the argu-
ment is simple: the process of adapting to severe injuries increases happiness,
but does so at a cost. That cost is self-alteration. Adaptation often requires
substantial adjustments to the victim's goals and ideals. These goals and
ideals are a central aspect of self-identity; in an important way, they consti-
tute who we are. What happiness research misses, then, is that the source of
one's happiness matters. And it matters because some sources of happiness
shape our self-identity in such a way that changing them changes us.
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I was murdered in France last summer ... I am not the same person who
set off singing, on that sunny Fourth ofJuly in the French countryside. I left
her in a rocky creek bed at the bottom of a ravine. I had to in order to
survive.1
INTRODUCTION
Recent happiness research has threatened to upend many of the
ways that we evaluate harm within tort law. Disabled individuals learn
to adapt to their new situation and are often just as happy postdis-
ability as they were predisability. This process-called hedonic adap-
tation-suggests that one prominent component of tort damages, loss
of enjoyment of life, should often yield no award. Simply put, if vic-
tims are similarly happy pre- and postinjury, then they have not lost
any enjoyment of life.
In response to this provocative claim, several scholars have sought
to broaden the definition of harm such that a person with fewer capa-
bilities after an injury is harmed even though he experiences no de-
crease in happiness.2 This position-rooted in Amartya Sen and
Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach to welfare-argues that wel-
fare should not be defined solely in terms of subjective measures of
I SusAN J. BUSON, AFTERMATH: VIOLENCE AND THE REMAKING OF THE SELF Xi, 21
(2002) (describing the aftermath of experiencing rape and attempted murder).
2 Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses, 37J. LEGAL STUD. S157, S176, S178 (2008) (arguing
that the legal system can award damages to one that loses a capability on the basis of
something aside from hedonic loss); Peter A. Ubel & George Loewenstein, Pain and Suffer-
ing Awards: They Shouldn't Be (just) About Pain and Suffering, 37 J. LEGAL STU. S195, S206
(2008) (noting that because "there are dimensions of richness of experience and complex-
ity and sophistication of thought that have value over and above simple happiness," it can-
not be the only measure of harm); Rick Swedloff & Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages and the
New Science of Happiness 37 (Mar. 2, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:/
/works.bepress.com/peter huang/1 (noting that "[i]n addition to, or quite possibly even
completely besides, the presence of positive affect and the absence of negative affect, peo-
ple want additional desiderata"); see Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, HedonicDam-
ages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAIND. L. REv. 745, 760 (2007) (arguing that the




happiness. Rather, welfare consists in the freedoms and opportunities
that an individual possesses. These freedoms and opportunities are
called capabilities. Therefore, " [t] hose who are able to run, or to have
sexual experiences, are better off than those who lack these capabili-
ties, even if the difference cannot be picked up in hedonic terms."3
The capabilities approach has two core limitations when applied
in this context. First, it requires determinations of which physical ca-
pabilities are fundamental to leading a truly human life. This is likely
to create substantial disagreement and be ultimately unresolvable.
Second, it provides poor guidance on the magnitude of harms. This
weakness stems from the fact that it captures some, but not all, of our
intuitions about harm. Head injuries, for example, commonly alter
the victim's personality. Yet the capabilities approach can only recog-
nize these changes as harms indirectly, when these changes result in
lowered capabilities. From the perspective of the preinjury victim,
however, personality changes are almost always harms. Because the
capabilities approach does not recognize the harms of personality
changes per se, it is unlikely to provide good guidance about the mag-
nitude of the harms created by severe disabilities.
This Article outlines a theory of harm that recognizes that some
injuries change a victim's ideals, goals, and preferences, and that
these changes are harms from the perspective of the preinjury victim.
The process of adapting to severe injuries increases happiness, but
does so at a cost. Some of the things that make us happy, especially
those that make us proud, are constitutive of our self-identity. If we
change the sources of our happiness and pride, we have changed our-
selves. If we are forced to change the sources of our happiness and
pride against our will, then we are harmed. Some injuries can force
us to undergo these changes because they require us to choose be-
tween two unpleasant fates: either we maintain our original ideals and
goals and risk falling short of them, or we alter the ideals and goals
that, at least in part, made us who we were. In either case there is a
harm, but a hedonic account of welfare can only detect the former.
The concept of a forced alteration of the self fills this gap.
The notion that some injuries result in forced alterations of the
self comports with many common-sense intuitions that show up rou-
tinely in autobiographical accounts of disability and in empirical stud-
ies of trauma. Quantitative research into the process of adapting to
traumatic events highlights the transformative nature of this adaptive
process. "Although the person who existed prior to the injury contin-
ues to exist, such traumatic loss transforms individuals in an irreversi-
ble manner, meaning that the former self cannot be fully
3 Sunstein, supra note 2, at S178.
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recaptured."4 Severe injuries or chronic illness can cause a "loss of
self" that leads to a "changed person." This talk helps define the
harms that can occur through the adaptive process. Some of our ide-
als, goals, and even preferences shape our self-identity in such a way
that changing them changes us. For ease of exposition, this Article
will refer to injuries that cause forced alterations of the self as self-
altering injuries.
The concept.of self-altering injury avoids the two key limitations
of the capabilities approach. First, it relies on a less capacious and less
controversial account of the good. More specifically, it relies on the
value of one form of autonomy: self-determination. Self-determina-
tion involves being the author of one's own ideals and goals, rather
than a mere conduit for the commitments of others. Self-altering in-
juries interfere with self-determination and are therefore readily cog-
nizable as harms. Second, the concept of self-altering injury can
identify and value the unique harms that stem from forced changes to
one's ideals and goals, rather than value them only indirectly through
their effects on capabilities.
The relationship between hedonic adaptation and self-alteration
implies that, to the extent that hedonic adaptation puts downward
pressure on tort awards, the concept of self-altering injury puts a cor-
responding upward pressure on those awards. Therefore, hedonic ad-
aptation, standing alone, does not show that juries systematically
overcompensate victims for severe disability.
The concept of self-altering injury is useful regardless of whether
hedonic adaption is a robust phenomenon, and regardless of whether
happiness research measures anything useful. Hedonic adaptation
works, in part, through a process of self-alteration. But self-alteration
can occur in the absence of hedonic adaptation. Head injuries are
the quintessential example. So even readers who are suspicious of
happiness research should be open to the concept of self-altering in-
jury. Ultimately, the goals of this Article are to open up a conversa-
tion about forced alterations of the self, provide an initial account of
the harm resulting from self-alteration that is grounded in both intui-
tion and theory, and argue that tort law should recognize these harms.
Part I of this Article describes hedonic adaptation and illustrates
its potential effects on damage awards in tort cases. Part I introduces
the capabilities approach and explains its limitations. Part III de-
scribes and defends the concept of a self-altering injury.
4 Elizabeth Kendall & Nicholas Buys, An Integrated Model of Psychosocial Adjustment Fol-
lowing Acquired Disability, 64 J. REHABILITATION 16, 17 (1998) (discussing the psychological
tension of navigating a change in self-identity that occurs post disability).
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I
HEDONIc ADAPTATION'S INFLUENCE ON TORT DAMAGES
In the context of tort law, hedonic adaptation refers to the pro-
cess of reducing the emotional effects of a stable injury.5 Hedonic
adaptation suggests that under one plausible measure of harm-the
happiness of the victim-most torts cause little or no long-term
harm. 6 This psychological phenomenon has threatened to upend
many of the ways that we evaluate harm and has the potential to radi-
cally alter tort damages.
A. Overview of Hedonic Adaptation
In the last five years, legal scholars have increasingly explored the
implications of the psychology of happiness.7 The vast literature on
happiness has yielded two major findings. First, many major life
events have only a temporary effect on self-reported happiness. Sec-
ond, people do not predict that they or others would adapt to major
life events. Instead, they erroneously predict that major life events
have lasting effects on happiness. Several recent articles have offered
comprehensive reviews of this literature8 ; a brief overview will suffice
here.
Many seemingly major life events have negligible effects on hap-
piness after one or two years.9 People have psychological immune sys-
5 Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 2, at S198.
6 See infra Part I.A.
7 See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco &Jonathan Masur, Happiness and
Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (2009) [hereinafter Happiness and Punishment]
(studying how adaptation to prison makes it difficult to fashion appropriate sentences);
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic Adaptation and the
Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1516, 1516 (2008) [hereinafter Bronsteen et
al., Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits] (noting the recent "emergence of
an interdisciplinary group of psychologists, economists, and public policy analysts devoted
to the study of happiness"); Sunstein, supra note 2, at S160 (noting the "emerging litera-
ture attempting to measure hedonic effects"); Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 2; see also
Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 2, at 746 (noting that the concept of adaptive prefer-
ences has played an important role in several fields over the past twenty-five years);
Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. REv. 1363, 1365 (2004)
(analyzing how research on happiness can inform income redistribution); Swedloff &
Huang, supra note 2, at 2 (noting the emergence of "legal hedonists" who argue that new
data on happiness requires changes to existing legal institutions).
8 For a basic summary of the literature, see Bronsteen et al., Hedonic Adaptation and
the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, supra note 7, at 1522-26, and Shane Frederick & George
Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOL-
oGY 302, 311-14 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).
9 These events will almost certainly have immediate, if fleeting, emotional effects.
Colette Hillebrand Duggan & Marcel Dijkers, Quality of Life After Spinal Cord Injury: A Quali-
tative Study, 46 REHABILITATION PSYCHOL. 3, 23 (2001) (reporting that the suicide rate for
those with spinal cord injuries is three to five times higher than the general population,
with most suicides occurring within a few years of the initial injury); Brett Smith & Andrew
C. Sparkes, Men, Sport, and Spinal Cord Injury: An Analysis of Metaphors and Narrative Types, 19
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temsI0 that prevent major life traumas such as quadriplegia,"
paraplegia, 12 amputation,13 severe burns, 14 and kidney disease' 5 from
having lasting effects on their happiness.16 Philip Brickman, Dan
Coates, and Ronnie Janoff-Bulman first suggested this process of he-
donic adaptation.17 They found that lottery winners were no happier
than nonlottery winners and that paraplegics were not nearly as un-
happy as they predicted.18 Many studies find absolutely no difference
in happiness measures between people with disabilities and control
groups of people without disabilities.19 Even when hedonic adapta-
tion does not fully restore one's preinjury level of happiness, it sub-
stantially mitigates hedonic losses. One recent longitudinal study in
Britain provided one of the most conservative estimates of hedonic
adaptation. It found that people tend to experience a sharp drop in
DISABILITY & Soc'y 613, 619-20 (2004) ("Before the accident I was happy and life was
good. The injury and everything that has happened since has choked any life and happi-
ness out of me. I have nothing now.... Am nothing.... My life is in darkness.... I'm
shattered.") (emphasis removed).
1o See generally Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in
Affective Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 617 (1998) (noting that individuals
neglect their psychological immune systems when making predictions about the duration
of their affective reactions to negative events).
II See Camille B. Wortman & Roxanne Cohen Silver, Coping with Irrevocable Loss, in
CATACLYSMS, CRISES, AND CATASTROPHES: PSYCHOLOGY IN AcIoN, 185, 197-99 (Gary R.
VandenBos & Brenda K. Bryant eds., 1987) (analyzing the effect of time on the happiness
of individuals who recently suffered spinal cord injuries).
12 See generally C. Lundqvist et al., Spinal Cord Injuries: Clinical, Functional, and Emotional
Status, 16 SPINE 78 (1991) (analyzing the effect of time on the moods of persons with
tetraplegia and paraplegia).
13 See Vida L. Tyc, Psychosocial Adaptation of Children and Adolescents with Limb Deficien-
cies: A Review, 12 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REv. 275, 275 (1992) (noting that "the available litera-
ture suggests that pediatric amputees report minimal psychosocial distress, achieve good
functional outcomes, and adapt well to their disability").
14 See David R. Patterson et al., Psychological Effects of Severe Burn Injuries, 113 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 362, 364 (1993) (arguing that "most people seem to undergo emotional adjustment
to burn injuries relatively well").
15 See Jason Riis et al., Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis: A Study Using
Ecological Momentary Assessment, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3, 7 (2005) (finding that
hemodialysis patients adapt to their condition).
16 Additionally, failing to obtain tenure appears to have no long-term hedonic impact.
Gilbert et al., supra note 10, at 623-24.
17 Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 917, 926 (1978) (suggesting that individuals overestimate
the duration of feeling generated by an event).
18 Id. at 920-22.
19 See, e.g., FAtima de N. Abrantes-Pais et al., Psychological or Physiological: Why Are Te-
traplegic Patients Content?, 69 NEUROLOGY 261, 261 (2007) (finding that persons with spinal
cord injuries report being overall content); Olga Horgan & Malcolm MacLachlan,
Psychosocial Adjustment to Lower-Limb Amputation: A Review, 26 DISABILITY & REHABILITATION
837, 839 (2004) (finding that while rates of depression in people with an amputation are
high between the first and second years following amputation, rates decrease after this
period to what is found in the general population); Riis et al., supra note 15, at 7 (finding
no difference in moods between dialysis patients and control patients).
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happiness just after the onset of a disability,20 but that happiness levels
rebound by 30% to 50% thereafter. 21 Even this degree of adaptation
is likely to surprise many and can support the argument that tort
awards are currently too high.
The various measures of happiness used in this research appear
to be reliable. Regardless of whether happiness is measured with a
single life-satisfaction question, or multiple times each day using a spe-
cialized palm pilot, studies routinely find evidence of hedonic adapta-
tion.22 Happiness measures also correlate sensibly with less conscious
indicators of happiness, such as smiling.23 Although measuring happi-
ness is not free of methodological difficulty, these measurements ap-
pear to reliably capture at least one dimension of well-being. 24 A full
accounting of whether happiness research is methodologically sound,
and produces results that are ethically relevant, is beyond the scope of
this Article. This Article will instead assume that happiness research
provides at least some information that is useful for determining
harm. The opposite conclusion-that happiness is entirely irrelevant
to determining harm-is implausible.
Hedonic adaptation is common but not universal. Some injuries
are more difficult to adapt to, and some people adapt more than
others. People rarely adapt to chronic pain and degenerative condi-
tions such as rheumatoid arthritis and multiple sclerosis.25 But many
20 Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? A Longitudinal
Study of Disability with Implications for Economists and judges, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1061, 1066
(2008) (noting that level of happiness falls abruptly in the year of injury). This Article
adopts the social model of disability. Under this model, the bare physical alteration of the
body that accompanies an injury is called an impairment. When the victim's surrounding
environment does not accommodate the impairment, the interaction of the impairment
and the environment creates a disability. For further discussions on these concepts, see
MICHAEL OLVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 11 (1990).
21 Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 20, at 1072. But see Richard E. Lucas, Long-Term
Disability Is Associated with Lasting Changes in Subjective Well-Being: Evidence from Two Nationally
Representative Longitudinal Studies, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 717, 722 (2007) (find-
ing no evidence of hedonic adaption based on the same underlying data).
22 See Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 2, at S200.
23 See, e.g., Paul Ekman et al., TheDuchenne Smile: Emotional Expression and Brain Physiol-
ogy II, 58 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 342, 342 (1990).
24 For a concise defense of happiness research, see Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 2,
at S199-S202. For several concerns about the importance of happiness research, see gen-
erally Martha C. Nussbaum, Who Is the Happy Warrior? Philosophy Poses Questions to Psychology,
37 J. LEGAL STUD. S81 (2008).
25 See Richard F. Antonak & Hanoch Livneh, Psychosocial Adaption to Disability and Its
Investigation Among Persons with Multiple Sclerosis, 40 Soc. Sci. MED. 1099, 1105 (1995) (not-
ing that reactions of anxiety, depression, and irritability are common during the period
when symptoms of multiple sclerosis become apparent, followed by a period of acceptance,
followed by a period of "pronounced and prolonged disintegration"); Craig A. Smith &
Kenneth A. Wallston, Adaptation in Patients with Chronic Rheumatoid Arthritis: Application of a
General Mode4 11 HEA.LTH PSYCHOL. 151, 151 (1992) (noting that rheumatoid arthritis has
been "linked to poor adjustment").
2011] 541
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people do adapt to stable and severe injuries. A host of environmen-
tal26 and personality factors27 contribute to the speed and complete-
ness of this adaptive process. Some people adapt so completely that
they would refuse a cure even if it were free and riskless.2 8 Others are
willing to pay high prices for cures.29
Although hedonic adaption is extremely common, people rarely
predict that it will occur.30 People erroneously predict that positive
events such as obtaining tenure 3 1 and moving to California3 2 will have
a long-term positive impact on their happiness. People also errone-
ously predict that negative life events such as paraplegia,33 kidney dis-
ease,3 4 colostomy,3 5 and breast cancer 3 6 will drastically lower their
26 See Dylan M. Smith et al., Health, Wealth, and Happiness: Financial Resources Buffer
Subjective Well-Being After the Onset of a Disability, 16 PSYCHOL. Sci. 663, 665 (2005) (finding
that wealth buffers against the detrimental effects of disability, but that the gap narrows
over time).
27 See Elizabeth Kendall & Deborah J. Terry, Psychosocial Adjustment Following Closed
Head Injury: A Modelfor Understanding Individual Differences and Predicting Outcome, 6 NEUROP-
SYCHOL. REHABILITATION 101, 115-16 (1996) (noting that "self-esteem and control expec-
tancies may play a role in the facilitation of adjustment after CHI").
28 See Nancy Weinberg, Physically Disabled People Assess the Quality of Their Lives, 45 REHA-
BILITATION LITERATURE 12, 14 (1984) (finding that, out of thirty patients who were inter-
viewed, two would refuse a free riskless cure, and three were "hesitant").
29 See Dylan M. Smith et al., Misremembering Colostomies? Former Patients Give Lower Util-
ity Ratings Than Do Current Patients, 25 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 688, 691 (2006) (finding that
current colostomy patients were willing to give up, on average, 15% of their remaining life
years to reverse the colostomy).
30 Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: Experiencing the Future, 317 Sci-
ENCE 1351, 1353 (2007) ("The tendency to underestimate how quickly we will adapt to a
wide range of pleasurable and painful events is probably the most commonly observed
error in research on hedonic prediction." (citation omitted)).
31 Gilbert et al., supra note 10, at 623-24.
32 See David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make People
Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL. Sci. 340, 345 (1998).
33 Although victims of spinal cord injuries have persistently lower quality of life rat-
ings than the general population,James Middleton et al., Relationship Between Quality of Life
and Self-Efficacy in Persons with Spinal Cord Injuries, 88 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITA-
TION 1643, 1643 (2007), people appear to exaggerate the negative effect of spinal cord
injuries on quality of life. See Peter A. Ubel et al., Disability and Sunshine: Can Hedonic Predic-
tions Be Improved by Drawing Attention to Focusing Illusions or Emotional Adaptation?, 11 J. Ex-
PERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 111, 117-18 (2005) (finding that subjects predicted low
quality of life after paraplegia, but that these rating increased when subjects were explicitly
asked to consider how they might adapt to the disability).
34 See David L. Sackett & George W. Torrance, The Utility of Different Health States as
Perceived by the General Public, 31 J. CHRONIC DISEASES 697, 702 (1978) (finding that individu-
als already on a home dialysis program rated their daily health state utility higher than
individuals predicted their daily health state utility would be if on dialysis).
35 See Norman F. Boyd et al., Whose Utilities for Decision Analysis?, 10 MED. DECISION
MAKING 58, 65 (1990).
36 See Kerry A. Wilson et al., Perception of Quality of Life by Patients, Partners and Treating
Physicians, 9 QUALiTy LIFE REs. 1041, 1045 (2000) (noting that physicians underestimate
patient quality of life for patients with metastatic breast cancer).
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quality of life.3 7 It is not just healthy people who incorrectly predict
the hedonic impact of injury. Studies indicate that patients who are
experiencing health problems have a strong preference to return to
their healthy state, even when their happiness levels have already
adapted to their condition:
In a number of studies, we not only asked healthy people how
happy they would be if they were sick but also asked people with
illness or disabilities to estimate how happy they would be if they
were healthy. Invariably, we found that patients believe they would
be substantially happier if they were healthy-indeed, they typically
predict an increase in happiness equal to the decrease in happiness
predicted by healthy people if they were sick. . . . [B]oth groups
agreed that they would be substantially happier if healthy than on
dialysis, although no such pattern was observed in their self-re-
ported levels of happiness.3 8
Even doctors mispredict the hedonic impact of injury on their pa-
tients.39 Lawyers in tort suits capitalize on these erroneous predic-
tions and routinely argue that the victim's disability will permanently
prevent them from enjoying life.40 Judges too, appear to believe that
disability creates lasting harm, even when faced with direct victim testi-
mony that "I can do all the things I used to do."4 1
B. The Relationship Between Hedonic Adaptation and Hedonic
Damages
Many courts allow tort victims to recover for "loss of enjoyment of
life"4 2 and presume that a host of disabilities inevitably decrease this
37 See generally Sackett & Torrance, supra note 34, at 702; Ubel et al., supra note 33, at
120 (noting that "people predict that their quality of life with various disabilities would be
lower than the quality of life actually reported by people who have those disabilities");
Peter A. Ubel et al., Misimagining the Unimaginable: The Disability Paradox and Health Care
Decision Making, 24 HEALTH PSYCHOL. S57, S57 (2005) (noting that people "mispredict the
impact that circumstances will have on their well-being and quality of life").
38 Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 2, at S203 (citation omitted).
39 Wilson et al., supra note 36, at 1045.
40 Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 2, at 752-53.
41 Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Anderson, 78 S.W.3d 392, 412 (Tex. App. 2001), review
granted, judgment vacated, (May 22, 2003); Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 2, at 755 ("In
many cases upholding hedonic damages awards, judges seem to have concluded explicitly
that the mere fact of disability, without more, necessarily limits life's enjoyment.").
42 See, e.g., Knight v. Lord, 648 N.E.2d 617, 623 (111. App. Ct. 1995); Canfield v.
Sandock, 563 N.E.2d 1279, 1281-83 (Ind. 1990); Estate of Pearson v. Interstate Power &
Light Co., 700 N.W.2d 333, 347 (Iowa 2005); Gregory v. Carey, 791 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Kan.
1990); Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Ky. 1997) (noting that it "is the purpose of
all tort law to compensate one for the harm caused by another and to deter future wrong-
doing"); Anderson v. Neb. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 538 N.W.2d 732, 740 (Neb. 1995); Swiler v.
Baker's Super Mkt., Inc., 277 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Neb. 1979) (noting that a majority of the
courts have approved inclusion of "loss of enjoyment of life as a consideration" that may be
instructed upon in the proper tort case); Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 102 P.3d 52, 64 (Nev.
2004); McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375-77 (N.Y. 1989); Fantozzi v. Sandusky
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enjoyment. The purpose of these damages is to compensate tort vic-
tims for limitations "on the injured person's ability to participate in
and derive pleasure from the normal activities of daily life, or for the
individual's inability to pursue his talents, recreational interests, hob-
bies, or avocations." 4 3 Samuel Bagenstos and Margo .Schlanger sur-
veyed the case law and found that courts often presume that
disabilities permanently decrease a victim's enjoyment of life.44 Be-
cause courts tend to talk about these damages as compensation for
losses of enjoyment, they are commonly called hedonic damages.4 5
Hedonic adaptation undermines the assumption that the postin-
jury victim does not enjoy life as much as she previously did. Bagen-
stos and Schlanger have argued that, if a victim is just as happy one
year after her injury as she was just before, then she has not perma-
nently lost any enjoyment of life.4 6 Instead, she has only suffered a
temporary decrease in enjoyment that quickly rebounds to preinjury
levels. Accordingly, they have argued for abolishing hedonic dam-
ages. 4 7 To the extent that: (1) damages for "loss of enjoyment of life"
are intended to compensate victims for permanent hedonic losses; (2)
hedonic adaptation is complete; and (3) the temporary disruption in
enjoyment can be compensated under other categories of damages or
is negligible, Bagenstos and Schlanger's conclusion is correct. Bagen-
stos and Schlanger have assumed a strong version of hedonic adapta-
tion, where happiness fully recovers from all injuries. Yet even if
hedonic adaptation were incomplete, their argument would still imply
that current jury awards for lost enjoyment of life are too high. Re-
gardless of whether one adopts the most aggressive or most conserva-
tive estimates of hedonic adaptation, it is likely that jurors are
systematically awarding excessive amounts for lost enjoyment of life.
Cement Prods. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 486 (Ohio 1992); Boan v. Blackwell, 541 S.E.2d 242,
245 (S.C. 2001). A growing minority separate lost enjoyment of life from other categories
of damages. Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic Damages: The Rapidly Bubbling
Cauldron, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1037, 1046 (2004).
43 Boan, 541 S.E.2d at 244. Other descriptions of these damages include: "disabilities
that include the basic mechanical body functions of walking, climbing, feeding oneself and
so on," McGarry v. Horlacher, 775 N.E.2d 865, 877-78 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002), "the ability to
enjoy the occupation of your choice, activities of daily living, social leisure activities and
internal well-being," Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 2000)
(quotations omitted), and the joy from "going on a first date, reading, debating politics,
the sense of taste, recreational activities, and family activities." Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v.
Johnson, 798 So. 2d 374, 381 (Miss. 2001).
44 Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 2, at 748-50. In an early New Jersey case, the
court stated that "[a] shriveled hand and wrist .... [D]eprives one of much of the enjoy-
ment of life." Haeussler v. Consol. Stone & Sand Co., 127 A. 602, 604 (N.J. 1925).
45 See, e.g., Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 2, at 748; Schwartz & Silverman, supra
note 42, at 1039.




Rejecting hedonic damages does not mean that disability goes
uncompensated. Bagenstos and Schlanger expressly reserve judg-
ment about what they term "disability damages."48 These damages
compensate for the disability itself, rather than the hedonic effects of
the disability.49 Although they do not provide a definition of disability
damages, and indeed do not even discuss them at any length, this cat-
egory of damages appears to reflect the intuition that lost abilities
should be compensable even when they do not affect overall happi-
ness levels. Courts have provided recovery for loss of limb, cognitive
impairments, and impaired abilities to engage in sports, among
others.5 0 At first glance these might appear to reflect disability dam-
ages. Unfortunately, these courts do not appear to distinguish be-
tween hedonic damages and disability damages.5 1 Instead, they
conflate the two categories by assuming that all disabilities have a
large negative impact on happiness. Therefore, it is impossible to tell
whether these cases are motivated by an independent concept of disa-
bility damages.
II
SALVAGING HARM: THE CAPABILITIEs APPROACH
When faced with strong evidence of hedonic adaptation, several
behavioral economists and legal scholars have nonetheless resisted the
idea that severe disability causes no lasting harm. They have uni-
formly turned to a single philosophical tradition-the capabilities ap-
proach-in order to salvage lay intuitions of harm.
A. The Puzzle
In two recent articles in the Journal of Legal Studies, Peter Ubel
and George Loewenstein as well as Cass Sunstein pursue similar lines
of reasoning. They argue that hedonic adaptation should not revolu-
tionize tort law. They first argue that hedonic adaptation is a robust
phenomenon; therefore, most injuries do not have a lasting effect on
levels of happiness. They then argue against a purely hedonic ac-
count of welfare. Ubel and Loewenstein present their argument as a
puzzle: even after being convinced that major injuries will not affect
long-term happiness, the authors remain convinced that many tort vic-
48 Id. at 751.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 757 n.49 (collecting cases).
51 Sunstein, supra note 2, at S180 ("A key question, which a reading of the cases can-
not answer, is whether the decisions are animated by some kind of hedonic judgment error
or instead an intuitive but sensible judgment about capabilities.").
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tims sustain substantial harm.5 2 They seek to resolve this puzzle by
arguing that harm should not be defined solely by happiness.5 3
B. Welfare and Harm
This Article defines harm as a welfare setback. 54 Welfare is not a
self-defining concept. There are three major accounts of welfare-
hedonic, preference-based, and objective-good accounts.55 Jeremy
Bentham advocated a hedonic definition of welfare and argued that
welfare is entirely constituted by subjective experiences of pleasure
and pain.5 6 Most happiness research adopts Bentham's definition.5 7
Under the hedonic account of welfare, hedonic adaptation substan-
tially reduces the harm caused by tortious injury.
One plausible way to salvage harm is to move to a preference-
based account of welfare. On this account, people are better off when
their preferences are satisfied.5 8 Ubel and Loewenstein admit that
they have enduring preferences against disability despite believing
that hedonic adaptation is a robust phenomenon.59 Even patients
who have experienced the disability, and have hedonically adapted to
it, have strong preferences to return to healthy states. In one well-
replicated study, colostomy patients were willing, on average, to give
up 15% of their remaining lifespan for a cure.60 These patients are
about as happy as control groups, suggesting that they had very strong
preferences for hedonically indistinguishable outcomes.6 1 If welfare
52 See Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 2, at S205.
53 See id. at S205-07.
54 Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death And Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regula-
tion, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1293, 1322-40 (2003).
55 See id. at 1295; see also MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERic A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF
CosT-BENEFIT ANALYSIs 29 (2006) (discussing major accounts of welfare).
56 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in JOHN
STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, ESSAY ON BENTHAM 33, 34 (Mary Warnock ed.
1962) ("By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit,
advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness . .. [or] to prevent the happening of mischief,
pain, evil, or unhappiness . . . .").
57 See BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAPPINESS AND EcoNoMics: HOW THE EcONOMv
AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECT WELL-BEING 3 (2002) (describing happiness as synonymous with
well-being); Nussbaum, supra note 24, at S82; see also Daniel Kahneman et al., Toward Na-
tional Well-Being Accounts, 94 AM. ECON. REv. 429, 429-31 (2004) (measuring happiness
through time budgets and affective ratings of experiences in order to gauge well-being).
58 See Mark C. Murphy, The Simple Desire-Fulfillment Theory, 33 Noos 247, 247 (1999)
(noting that "[a]ccording to the desire-fulfillment, or DF, theory, an agent's well-being is
constituted by the obtaining of states of affairs that are desired by that agent").
59 See Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 2, at S205.
60 See Smith et al., supra note 29, at 690, 691. For a broader discussion of these stud-
ies, see Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 2, at S202-04.
61 Smith et al., supra note 29, at 692 (finding that: current patients, community mem-
bers, and former patients who had their colostomies reversed, all exhibited similar levels of
life satisfaction; that patients and former patients reported similar moods and quality of
life; and that patients only exhibited slightly lower quality of life scores than community
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is defined as preference satisfaction, then these patients are suffering
a welfare setback and therefore a harm.
Although it has initial appeal, the preference-based account of
welfare does not necessarily support intuitions about harm and disa-
bility. Most preference-based accounts of welfare seek to "launder"
preferences to ensure that they are well informed.6 2 A fleeting prefer-
ence for death that quickly evaporates, for example, is not well in-
formed. Welfare is only created by satisfying well-informed
preferences; satisfying ill-informed preferences does not count.6 3 Sur-
prisingly, victims' preferences to return to their preinjury states might
not be well informed. Their enduring and powerful preferences to
avoid disability may be based on equally enduring and powerful mis-
perceptions. Both patients and nonpatients have preferences for
healthy states.6 4 Both populations agree that healthy people are hap-
pier.65 However, both populations are wrong because they ignore he-
donic adaptation.66 At first blush, it appears that we should trust the
people who have experienced both healthy and nonhealthy states. Yet
there is reason to distrust their assessments. Not only do patients and
nonpatients agree that healthy states produce more happiness, they
also agree on the amount of happiness that health produces.67 This
suggests that both populations are using the same simple (and errone-
ous) heuristic to assess the hedonic effects of health states.6 8 There-
fore, it is not clear that enduring preferences to avoid disability are
well informed.
members); see also Riis et al., supra note 15, at 7 (finding that hemodialysis patients "do not
appear to be much, if at all, less happy than people who do not have kidney disease").
62 See Adler, supra note 54, at 1305 ("Indeed, many preferentialists now stipulate that
the preferences which ground welfare must be fully informed.") (quotations omitted); Dan
Brock, Quality of Life Measures in Health Care and Medical Ethics, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 95,
97 n.5 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993) ("Virtually all discussions of desire or
preference satisfaction theories of the good contain some provision for correcting
preferences.").
63 See Adler, supra note 54, at 1305.
64 See, e.g., Riis et al., supra note 15, at 7, 8 ("Both patients and controls .. . predicted
that the difference in mood experienced under health versus illness would be large.");
Smith et al., supra note, 29 at 691 (finding that both patients and nonpatients were willing
to give up remaining life-years to avoid living with a colostomy).
65 Riis et al., supra note 15, at 7.
66 Id. at 7-8 (noting that "patients are themselves not aware of the extent to which
they have adapted to their condition").
67 See Ubel & Loewenstein supra note 2, at S203-04 (noting that patients and healthy
persons made similar errors in predicting the impact of disability on happiness).
68 Similar heuristics influence a wide array of predicted and remembered pain and
pleasure. These schemas dominate predictions, and play a large role in memory as well.
The reality of an experience is not irrelevant to the memory of it, but there is a large
literature showing pervasive effects of these heuristics on memories of pain and pleasure.
See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson et al., "How Happ Was I, Anyway?" A Retrospective Impact Bias, 21
Soc. COGNITION 421, 431-33 (2003).
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For these reasons, Ubel and Loewenstein do not shift to a prefer-
ence-based account of welfare. However, they do not ignore patient
preferences either. They argue that the existence of enduring prefer-
ences to avoid disability should motivate a more searching inquiry into
whether disability causes harm, and whether those who conflate harm
with decreases in happiness have an unnecessarily impoverished view
of harm.69 Patient preferences, while not dispositive, deserve special
weight because they persist even after people experience both healthy
and unhealthy states,70 and even after people come to understand he-
donic adaptation. Ubel and Loewenstein argue that "people legiti-
mately care about more than just the pain and suffering that results
from an injury"71 and that "happiness is not the only thing that mat-
ters in life."72 To defend this conclusion, they draw on one promi-
nent objective-good account of welfare-the capabilities approach-
and use it to illustrate the type of harm that remains even after com-
plete hedonic adaptation.73
C. The Capabilities Approach and Its Limitations
The capabilities approach was designed to deal with the following
problem: a preference-based or hedonic definition of welfare could
lead to the conclusion that a wealthy and accomplished person and a
routinely degraded slave might have equally good lives. 74 This would
be true if they each exhibited the same level of happiness, and satis-
fied their preferences to a similar degree. The slave might exhibit
surprisingly high levels of happiness if she has learned to adapt her
preferences to her situation and find pleasure in the smallest of
things.75 Amartya Sen questions whether we can really conclude that
these two people are equally well off: "Can we possibly believe that
[the slave] is doing well just because he is happy and satisfied? Can
the living standard of a person be high if the life that he or she leads is
69 Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 2, at S204-05.
70 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES AP-
PROACH 152-61 (2000) (arguing that philosophers should use common preferences as a
heuristic to determine what is good and noting preferences for a state of world are espe-
cially diagnostic when the holder of these preferences has experienced all relevant states of
the world).
71 Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 2, at S195.
72 Id. at S205.
73 Id. at S206.
74 See NuSSBAUM, supra note 70, at 8, 114 (noting that an approach based on capabili-
ties rejects an approach based on preferences because it conducts a critique of "the many
ways in which habit, fear, low expectations, and unjust background conditions deform peo-
ple's choices and even their wishes for their own lives").
75 AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABIUTIEs 21 (1985) ("A person who is ill-fed,
undernourished, unsheltered and ill can still be high up in the scale of happiness or de-




full of deprivation?"76 This is the problem of adaptive preferences.7 7
Sen and Martha Nussbaum have offered a competing, objective-good,
account of welfare called the capabilities approach that aims to ad-
dress this problem.
Under the capabilities approach, welfare is a multidimensional
concept that includes some set of capabilities that are each central to
leading a truly human life.7 8 A capability is the opportunity and free-
dom7 9 to obtain "such elementary things as being adequately nour-
ished, being in good health, avoiding escapable morbidity and
premature mortality, etc., to more complex achievements such as be-
ing happy, having self-respect, taking part in the life of the commu-
nity, and so on."80 Serious injuries are classic examples of events that
might hinder one or more fundamental capabilities. Although there
is a robust debate about which capabilities are fundamental, there is
likely to be some consensus as well."' Martha Nussbaum has provided
a list of ten capabilities that she argues are each important in a large
number of reasonable ethical doctrines. These include:
1. Life;
2. Bodily health;
3. Bodily integrity (including the ability to move freely from
place to place, and be free from physical assault);
4. Senses, imagination, and thought (including the ability to
reason, to express oneself, to seek pleasure, and to avoid
pain);
5. Emotions;
6. Practical reason (being able to reflect about and ultimately
choose a conception of the good);
7. Affiliation (being able to experience love and friendship);
8. Concern for nature and other species (being able to have
concern for plants, animals, and nature);
76 Amartya Sen, The Standard of Living: Lecture I, Concepts and Critiques, in THE STAN-
DARD OF LIVING 1, 8 (Geoffrey Hawthorn ed., 1987).
7 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DIsABIuT-Y, NATIONALITY, SPECIES
MEMBERSHIP 73 (2006) (noting that "[pleople adjust their preferences to what they think
they can achieve, and also to what their society tells them a suitable achievement is for
someone like them").
78 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 70, at 72-74 (noting that "we may judge that the absence
of capability for a central function is so acute that the person is not really a human being at
all, or any longer").
79 See Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen, Introduction to THE QUALITY OF LIFE, supra
note 62, at 1, 3, 10.
80 AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 39 (1992).
81 NUSSBAUM, supra note 77, at 79, 304-05 (noting that there is likely to be an "over-
lapping consensus" on these capabilities); Robert Erikson, Desciptions of Inequality: The
Swedish Approach to Welfare Research, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE, supTa note 62, at 67, 74
("The ... components [of well-being] do not constitute a self-evident choice, but similar




10. Control over one's political and physical environment.82
Two aspects of the capabilities approach hinder its applicability
in the context of measuring the harm that results from disabilities.
First, Nussbaum's list only partially avoids problems that confront all
objective-good accounts of welfare. More specifically, the process of
defining which physical abilities are central to leading a truly human
life is likely to lead to contested issues of value that are difficult to
resolve. Second, the capabilities approach is likely to give poor gui-
dance as to the proper magnitude of harms stemming from self-alter-
ing injuries.
Nussbaum's list of fundamental capabilities partially avoids the
problems of other objective-good accounts of welfare. Objective-good
theories face one central criticism, which Ronald Dworkin nicely cap-
tures: "IM]y life cannot be better for me in virtue of some feature or
component I think has no value."8 3 For example, it is hard to say that
someone is better off for listening to opera if she is indifferent to op-
era or, more pointedly, if she actively hates listening to opera. There-
fore, it is hard to defend the claim that listening to opera is an
objective good. The capabilities approach does not claim that opera,
or indeed any specific actions or ways of being, improves welfare. In-
stead, the capabilities approach focuses on opportunities and free-
doms.8 4 The capabilities approach claims that people are better off if
they have the freedom to listen to opera (or not) and the educational
opportunities that might foster an appreciation for opera. Although
this approach still imposes a conception of the good (capabilities are
held to improve welfare regardless of whether people derive pleasure
from them and regardless of whether they have a preference for
them), it is a conception of the good that is likely to garner more
widespread support. One can value the freedom to listen to all musi-
cal genres without valuing the act of listening to each and every one of
them. Ultimately, Nussbaum's focus on capabilities responds to Dwor-
kin's concern by making an empirical claim: the vast majority of peo-
ple value freedoms and opportunities, even if they disagree about the
most valuable way to actualize these freedoms.8 5
82 NUSSBAUM, supra note 70, at 78-80; Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamen-
tal Entitlements: Sen and SocialJustice, 9 FEMINIST ECON. 33, 41 (2003).
83 T. M. Wilkinson, Dworkin on Paternalism and Well-Being, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.,
433, 439 (1996) (citing RoNALD DwoRmN, FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERAL EQUALTY 77 (1989
Tanner Foundation Lectures) (1999)).
84 See Nussbaum & Sen, supra note 79, at 3, 10.
85 Nussbaum believes that this consensus is rooted in common intuitions about
human dignity and human flourishing. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 70, at 76, 83, 101 ("The
account of the central capabilities is based on an intuitively powerful idea of truly human
functioning that has roots in many different traditions and is independent of any particu-
lar metaphysical or religious view.").
550 [Vol. 96:535
SELF-ALTERING INJURY
Nussbaum's list still encounters some of the problems of other
objective-good accounts. As a general rule, having more opportuni-
ties is good and increases well-being. 86 But Nussbaum rightly limits
her focus to those opportunities that have a particularly large impact
on well-being. That is, she limits her list to opportunities that "can be
convincingly argued to be of central importance in any human life."8 7
It is not clear that all elements of her list meet these criteria. For
example, Nussbaum readily admits that " [b] eing able to live with con-
cern for . . . animals, plants, and the world of nature"88 is the most
controversial element of her list, and may not develop the necessary
overlapping consensus.89 This does not give us reason to reject the
other elements of the list, so it is important to look more closely at
other elements such as "bodily integrity," the element that is most ob-
viously implicated in cases of physical disability.
Nussbaum expresses her list at a high level of generality, and she
acknowledges the need to concretize it in order to provide clear pol-
icy guidance.9 0 But this process is likely to reintroduce Dworkin's con-
cerns. Consider Cass Sunstein's quite plausible claim that: "Those
who are able to run, or to have sexual experiences, are better off than
those who lack these capabilities, even if the difference cannot be
picked up in hedonic terms."91 Sunstein does not simply claim that
these capabilities make people slightly or infinitesimally better off-
rather, he asserts that they make people at least noticeably better off.
To be perfectly consistent with the capabilities approach, we would
have to make the further claim that these capabilities are "central ele-
ments of truly human functioning."9 2 This claim, while plausible, can
plausibly be denied. Running is not central to human flourishing.
Far from it, it is actively despised by millions of people. It is therefore
unlikely that the ability to run even contributes noticeably to well-be-
ing. Although a much closer call, it is not even clear that sexual inter-
course is central to human flourishing. It is certainly one method of
deriving physical pleasure and bonding with others. But there are
other methods for accomplishing each of these goals. The process of
86 For some exceptions to this rule, see generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF
CHOICE: WHY MORE Is LESs 117-200 (2004) (questioning whether increased opportunities
for choice actually makes people happier).
87 NUSSBAUM, supra note 70, at 74.
88 Id. at 80.
89 See id. at 80 n.85.
90 See id. at 105 (acknowledging the need to concretize her list in order for it to be
relevant to policy decisions); Sunstein, supra note 2, at S176 n.7 (discussing disability as a
loss in capabilities and noting that the more concrete and ordinary sense of capabilities
"belongs in the same general family" as Nussbaum's more abstract definition of
capabilities).
91 Sunstein, supra note 2, at S178.
92 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 70, at 74.
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concretizing Nussbaum's list to account for physical impairments,
therefore, reintroduces some of the contested questions of value that
plague objective-good accounts.93
The notion of self-altering injury is also rooted in an objective-
good account, but it requires adoption of only one, hopefully less con-
troversial, objective good: the freedom to maintain the set of ideals,
goals, and preferences that people take to define who they are and
who they want to be. Part III.C.2 lays out a full defense below. For
now, it is sufficient to clarify my claim without defending it. The no-
tion of self-altering injury relies on a less capacious and less controver-
sial account of the good than does the capabilities approach.
The capabilities approach also appears ill suited to capture some
of our intuitions of harm. Severe head injuries often cause changes to
a person's temperament that are severe enough for relatives to claim
that the victim's personality has changed. 94 From the perspective of
the preinjury victim, drastic alterations in personality are almost assur-
edly a harm. Yet the capabilities approach can only recognize these
personality changes as harms if they alter the victim's capabilities. For
example, if the injury led the victim to be more aggressive and less
empathetic, then the injury caused harm by reducing the victim's ca-
pability to form lasting friendships.95 But what if the injury caused the
victim to be more social and more empathetic? Oliver Sacks de-
scribed one patient whose neurosyphilis stimulated portions of her
brain and caused her to become more energetic and sociable.9 6
These changes increased the victim's freedom to form meaningful re-
lationships, and could therefore constitute an improvement under the
capabilities approach. But it is not clear that such changes are invaria-
bly improvements from the perspective of the predisease "victim." At
the very least, we would want to know whether the predisease self val-
ued her previous tastes for social interaction.9 7 This particular patient
93 Nussbaum is well aware of this, and notes items on her list will be construed differ-
ently in different societies. See id. at 77. Therefore, the contested issues of value that ap-
pear when we try to concretize her list problematize the use of the capabilities approach in
the context of tortious loss of physical capabilities, but do not problematize the capabilities
approach generally.
94 See infra Part III.B.1.
95 This determination requires a conceptual baseline, which will most often be the
capabilities of the average person. See Ani B. Satz, A jurisprudence of Dysfunction: On the Role
of "Normal Species Functioning" in Disability Analysis, 6 YALE J. HEALTH PoL'Y L. & ETHICS 221,
224 (2006) (advocating that the Supreme Court should consider "normal species function-
ing" when deciding eligibility for protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
96 OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MIsrOOK His WIFE FOR A HAT 98 (Harper Perennial
1990) (1970).
97 Matthis Synofzik & Thomas E. Schlaepfer, Stimulating Personality: Ethical Criteria for
Deep Brain Stimulation in Psychiatric Patients and for Enhancement Purposes, 3 BIOTECHNOLOGY
J. 1511, 1514 (2008) ("[T]he ethically decisive question is not whether [brain surgery]
alters personality or not, but whether it does so in a good or bad way from the patient's
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was pleased with her elevated mood, but also expressed a desire that it
not be elevated further.98 This suggests that not all capabilities-en-
hancing changes will be welcome.
These cases are assuredly rare, but they point to an important
limitation of the capabilities approach-it cannot give a correct mea-
sure of damages if it is not focused on the correct harms. In cases of
extreme personality change, the capabilities approach might focus on
losses in one's ability to make friends. However, the magnitude of this
harm may be far different from the magnitude of the harm associated
with a complete loss of one's former personality. The notion of self-
altering injury, by contrast, can recognize that forced personality
changes constitute harms, and value them directly.
The next section describes and defends the concept of a self-al-
tering injury. Such injuries can be categorized as harms if they suffi-
ciently alter the victim's ideals, goals, and preferences. The concept
of self-altering injury is not a complete theory of harm. It therefore
supplements hedonic accounts of harm, preference-based accounts of
harm, and accounts of harm rooted in the capabilities approach.99
Yet this dimension of harm is likely to be large and has not yet been
recognized.
very own perspective." (emphasis omitted)). Consider one patient who received deep
brain stimulation (DBS)-a process that involves the implantation of a pacemaker into the
brain to help control electrical storms that cause tremors associated with Parkinson's dis-
ease. Prior to the procedure, this patient hid her condition from workmates and reported
being very committed to work: "As long as I have my work, I still exist; the day I can no
longer go to work, it will be as if the curtain came down on my life." M. Schfipbach et al.,
Neurosurgery in Parkinson Disease: A Distressed Mind in a Repaired Body?, 66 NEUROLOGY 1811,
1812 (2006). After the surgery, her symptoms disappeared. Yet she now wanted to tell
others about her condition and did not go back to work. When asked why she did not
return to work, she simply said: "I ... prefer to spend my time doing other things." Id. It is
not clear whether these changes resulted from DBS itself, or instead from the radical lifes-
tyle changes that she underwent when her symptoms disappeared entirely. However, given
how little we know about DBS, Synofzik & Schlaepfer, supra, at 1516 (noting that the "long-
term cognitive, emotional and behavioral effects of psychiatric DBS are still largely un-
known"), and given its invasiveness, it is certainly plausible that DBS itself had a role in
altering what this patient valued. A recent conference on bioethics and personal identity
further supports the contention that DBS might plausibly alter values. This conference was
organized around four fictional case studies, one of which included a mild-mannered re-
publican patient who underwent DBS and later became a gregarious democrat. See David
M. Blass, Case Studies, in PERSONAL IDENTITY AND FRACrURED SELVES 50, 59 (Debra J.H. Ma-
thews et al. eds., 2009).
98 SACKs, supra note 96, at 98.
9 Below, this Article will briefly lay out the argument that the concept of self-altering
injury can be integrated into the capabilities approach, as an element of Practical Reason.
If this is correct, then the limitations described above are not attributable to the capabili-
ties approach itself, but rather to applications of the capabilities approach that focus too
narrowly on the physical consequences of impairment. The main thrust of this Article,




SALVAGING HARM: SELF-ALTERING INJURY
A. The Self
In order to begin the process of describing self-altering injuries, it
is useful to start with a discussion of the self. The concept of self is not
easy to define, and has spawned a tremendous amount of philosophi-
cal debate.100 Nonetheless, we can make some progress here by look-
ing at notions of autonomy. Autonomy is a protean term, but one
core aspect of it is self-determination.' 01 And the prefix "self' means
much the same thing in the term self-determination as it does in the
term self-altering injury. A person is self-determined to the extent that
she is the author of her own ideals, goals and preferences.10 2 To see
the value of self-determination, consider its opposite. A person who is
not self-determined is merely a conduit for the ideals, goals, and pref-
erences of others or of her culture. She takes no part in deciding the
course of her life, or in shaping her conception of the good. This
person is an automaton, and an automaton is not a self. The concept
of the self, therefore, is deeply connected to one's conception of what
is good and worthwhile in life.
In a very real sense, we are our ideals, goals, and preferences. But
ideals, goals, and preferences do not all occupy the same weighty role
in defining the self. Ideals are more central to what makes us who we
are than, for example, our goals of learning new languages or our
preferences of ice cream flavors. Our ideals constitute the type of per-
son we want to be and the ultimate goods that we strive toward. Our
choice among potential ideals-of how we want to live-is a large part
of what makes us who we are. It is akin to what Harry G. Frankfurt has
called "second-order desires," which are desires about one's own set of
desires. 03 Second-order desires include, for example, the desire to be
a better person or a more patient parent. Gerald Dworkin argues that
"[b]y exercising such a capacity [for second-order desires], persons
define their nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, and
take responsibility for the kind of person they are." 104 Similarly,
Frankfurt has argued that a person's second-order desires are what
100 See DAVID DEGRAZIA, HUMAN IDENTITY AND BIOETHICS 1-10 (2005).
101 JOEL FEINBERG, 3 THE MORAL LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL lAW: HARM TO SELF 27-28,
33-34 (1986).
102 See id. at 33-34.
103 Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5, 6-7
(1971) ("Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also
want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives." (emphasis omitted)); see also
GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 16-20 (1988) (discussing sec-
ond-order desires and the process of deciding what kind of person to become).
104 DwoIGN, supra note 103, at 20.
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makes her human.1 0 5 In his discussions on integrity, Bernard Wil-
liams noted that some ideals are identity conferring in that "unless I
am propelled forward by [them], it is unclear why I should go on at
all."' 06 Here the language of identity is an alternative to the language
of the self: each term refers to a set of important values or commit-
ments by which we choose to live our lives.
Although one's ideals are particularly likely to be identity confer-
ring, people may also strongly identify with their goals, preferences, or
activities. For some, running marathons defines who they are. For
others, making partner in a law firm may be an identity-conferring
goal. While ideals are quintessentially associated with one's core iden-
tity or self, activities or goals can be similarly identity conferring, at
least for some people. 07
This view of the self dovetails nicely with narrative accounts of the
self. Charles Taylor, for example, argues that our notion of the self is
deeply intertwined with notions of the good. 08 A self, as we use that
term, is a being who has a value system that allows her to make qualita-
tive distinctions between what is better and what is worse. 09 Taylor
refers to these value systems as frameworks.110 These frameworks pro-
vide the yardstick that people use to judge whether their lives are go-
ing well, and whether anything in life has any meaning."n
The concept of self is closely aligned with the concept of an iden-
tity.112 When we ask ourselves "who am I?" we are not generally asking
about our name, address, or even physical features. We are asking
about our frameworks.
To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My iden-
tity is defined by the commitments and identifications which pro-
vide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from
case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or
what I endorse or oppose. In other words, it is the horizon within
which I am capable of taking a stand.' 13
105 Frankfurt, supra note 103, at 11 (discussing second-order volitions as a specific type
of what I refer to above as a second-order desire).
106 BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK 12-14 (1981).
107 MARYA SCHECHTMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF SELVEs 77 (1996) ("[A]ll of the charac-
teristics that are part of a person's history are presumed to contribute to making up her
identity. Some, however, play a more central role than others and are more truly expres-
sive of who she is.").
108 CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTIlY 3, 34
(1989).
109 See id. at 30, 32.
110 Id. at 19.
111 See id. at 21.
112 See id. at 28.
113 Id. at 27.
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Frameworks are not an optional set of beliefs that selves may or
may not have. To understand the foundational importance of
frameworks, it is again useful to think of a self without any. For this
being, nothing in life can have any meaning or significance, nothing
can be worth doing, and the notion of "making sense" of one's life
becomes incoherent. 114 Even a pure, coldly calculating utilitarian has
a framework. This pure utilitarian has a clear sense of what is good
and what is worth pursuing.'1 5 That good is maximizing aggregate
welfare. A being entirely without a framework would be outside of
what we call persons or selves. We would judge such a being as deeply
damaged and pathological. 16
The concept of a self, therefore, is intimately tied to conceptions
of the good. A self is a being who has (however rough and incom-
plete) a conception of the good. This Article describes these
frameworks as one's ideals, and thus-in a very real sense-we are our
ideals.
B. Self-Alteration
A range of traumatic events can disrupt one's preferences, goals,
and even one's ideals. These changes may sometimes simply be the
result of gaining a new perspective. On this account, traumatic events
simply provide information that was unavailable before, and people
consciously alter their preferences, goals, and ideals in light of their
new information. This account does a poor job of describing both
how people predict trauma to affect them and how they respond to
actual trauma. The effects of trauma on one's preferences, goals, and
ideals are often far less deliberative. Severe permanent disabilities, for
example, can increase the difficulty of satisfying some former prefer-
ences, achieving some former goals, and living up to some former ide-
als. The process of hedonically adapting to disabilities is the process
of revising these former commitments. Such adaptation is largely an
unconscious process,' 17 and can happen even when the former com-
mitments were central to one's preinjury identity.
114 Id. at 18-19 (noting that without a framework "nothing is worth doing, the fear is
of a terrifying emptiness, a kind of vertigo, or even a fracturing of our world").
115 See id. at 31.
116 Id. ("[T] he portrait of an agent free from all frameworks ... spells for us a person
in the grip of an appalling identity crisis.... [A] person without a framework altogether
would be outside our space of interlocution; he wouldn't have a stand in the space where
the rest of us are. We would see this as pathological.").
117 See Gilbert et al., supra note 10, at 619. See generally TIMorav D. WILsoN, STRANGERS




1. Disability Research and Altered Selves
The easiest cases to conceptualize as self-altering concern cogni-
tive impairments stemming from head injury. But physical impair-
ments can also be self-altering because the process of adapting to
these impairments can be transformative of the things that make us
who we are-our ideals, goals, and preferences.
a. Traumatic Head Injury
Head injuries often cause personality changes severe enough to
justify the conclusion that, post injury, the victim is not completely the
same person. "[T] he most serious long term morbidity after head in-
jury is psychological" rather than physical.' 18 Head injuries often
cause increased aggression, moodiness, depression, anxiety, and vio-
lent behavior1 19 They are associated with reduced social interactions,
increased friction with friends, and increased risk of divorce. 120 In
one study, researchers interviewed a relative of people who had exper-
ienced head injury. Eighty-four percent of these relatives indicated
that the victim had an impaired ability to understand social situations
and feel empathy for others. 121
Victims of head injury change in much more fundamental ways as
well. In another study of severe head injury, one of the victim's rela-
tives (often a spouse or parent) was asked to "report any changes in
the patient which had emerged after injury, and which were still pre-
sent."1 22 Researchers first asked these questions one year after the in-
jury and again five years after the injury.123 One year after the injury,
60% of these relatives reported that the victim had undergone a
"[p]ersonality change."124 A greater percentage reported that the vic-
tim showed increases in irritability (67%) and a bad temper (64%),
while others reported increases in depression (51%), rapid mood
changes (57%), anxiety (57%), and even threats of violence (15%).125
These are serious changes in personality traits that most would iden-
tify as fundamental to identity. When a mild-mannered person be-
comes anti-social, aggressive, and moody, it becomes difficult to claim
118 N. Brooks et al., The Five Year Outcome of Severe Blunt Head Injury: A Relative's View, 49
J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY, & PSYCHIATRY 764, 764 (1986).
119 Id. at 765; Kendall & Terry, supra note 27, at 103, 104.
120 Kendall & Terry, supra note 27, at 102-03.
121 Id. at 105 (citing Nils R. Varney & Lynette Menefee, Psychosocial and Executive Deficits
Following Closed Head Injury: Implications for Orbital Frontal Cortex, 8J. HEAD TRAuMA REHABI-
ITATION 32, 35 (1993)). Although not all head-injury victims will undergo these personal-
ity changes, many will. Id. at 105, 115 (suggesting that this heterogeneity is due to differing
personality traits and levels of social support).
122 Brooks et al., supra note 118, at 765 (emphasis omitted).
123 Id. at 767.




that she is the same person. After another four years, personality
changes were even more common. At this time, 74% of relatives indi-
cated that the victim's personality had changed. 1 2 6
Many of the personality changes that head injuries cause can be
readily conceptualized as losses under the capabilities approach. The
most common personality changes-depression, aggression, and lack
of empathy-result in social impairments. The ability to create and
maintain human relationships is a fundamental capability.' 2 7 There-
fore, many of these victims will be made worse off by the injury.
Yet there is something incomplete about applying the capabilities
approach here. Under this approach, if the victim becomes more so-
cial after the injury, he would be better off for it. This may make
sense sometimes, especially if prior to the injury the victim wanted to
be more social.128 But what if, preinjury, the victim had alienated
others because he held strong beliefs that he aggressively fought for?
Suppose a head injury caused Rahm Emanuel and Bill O'Reilly to get
along with both Republicans and Democrats alike. Could we really say
that they are better off postinjury? Can we really say that Bill O'Reilly
is better off being kind and gentle, even if he begins to donate money
to causes that he previously held in contempt, such as President
Obama's health care plan? It is more natural here to say that he has
changed. The new Bill may be happier than the old, and he may have
more capabilities, but the preinjury Bill is not happier and enjoying
these greater capabilities. That person is, at least in part, gone.129
More importantly, the above example again shows that if we use
the capabilities approach to estimate the magnitude of harms stem-
ming from head injuries, we are likely to be misled. It is not clear that
the degree of personality change will always correlate well with the
degree of capability-reducing personality change. Yet this correlation
would have to be very strong to justify using the capabilities approach
to estimate the harms caused to Bill O'Reilly in the above example.
This problem stems from the fact that the capabilities approach recog-
nizes an incomplete set of harms. The concept of self-altering injury,
126 Id.
127 See Nussbaum, supra note 82, at 41-42.
128 See SACKS, supra note 96, at 141 (reporting on a patient who enjoyed the elevated
moods that her neurosyphilis created, and wished to live within this phase of the disease
rather than seek a cure that would return her to her original state).
129 This critique of the capabilities approach mirrors John Christman's critique of sub-
jective welfare. He argues that happiness and preference satisfaction are inadequate mea-
sures of well-being because people can be made better off by forcibly altering their
preferences. This "leave[s] totally out ... the special relation that obtains between a person
and that person's set of (autonomous) preferences." John Christman, Introduction to THE




by contrast, can recognize personality changes as harms per se and
value them accordingly.
The concept of a self-altering injury also explains why impair-
ments of cognitive ability are harms. Ubel and Loewenstein argue
that if an injury turns someone into a "happy simpleton," she has suf-
fered a reduction in welfare even if she becomes happier.1 3 0 " [T]here
are dimensions of richness of experience and complexity and sophisti-
cation of thought that have value over and above simple happi-
ness."13 Sunstein makes a similar argument regarding education:
"[E]ducation as such contributes to a richer life. Even if well-edu-
cated people do not seem happier according to a hedometer, their
enjoyments are more numerous and qualitatively dis-
tinct; . . . education is valuable whatever its effects on utility. ... "12
John Stuart Mill perhaps said it best: "It is better to be a human being
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied." 33
Mill's concept of higher pleasures invites criticisms of elitism.134
Yet to the extent that we are dealing with tort law, these criticisms can
be avoided. Mill is attempting to answer the question: what makes
one person better off than another? Tort law does not need to answer
this question. Instead, it must only answer a different and narrower
one: Is someone worse off if forced to transform into a happy simpleton
or a pig? This can be answered without recourse to Mills' higher vir-
tues. Humans are not pigs. If a person's cognitive capacities were
reduced to that of a pig, that person would no longer exist. They
would be (at least mostly) dead. Similarly, pigs are not humans. If a
pig were transformed into a human, the pig would be dead-it would
lose all that made it a pig (e.g., a love of mud and the rich aroma of
rotting corn). These types of cognitive transformations destroy much
of what gives content to the idea of a self. The concept of self-altering
injury, then, does not require any comparative judgments about the
quality of life of pigs and humans. Similarly, it does not require any
comparative judgments about the quality of life of pre- and postdis-
ability victims. Richard Abel has argued that "l[p] rofound injury, like
130 See Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 2, at S207-08.
1'1 Id. at S206.
132 Sunstein, supra note 2, at S179.
133 JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 10 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publ'g 1979)
(1861). Compare Mill's view to Bentham's: "Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin [a sim-
ple child's game] is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry. If the
game of push-pin furnish more pleasure, it is more valuable than either." JEREMY BEN-
THAM, The Rationale of Reward, in 2 The WORKS OFJEREMY BENTHAM 189, 253 (John Bowring
ed., London, Simpkin, Marshall & Co. 1843).
134 See NORMAN E. BOWIE & ROBERT L. SIMON, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE POLrrCAL OR-
DER: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 30-31 (3d ed. 1998) (noting
that "many objected to the elitism of Mill's panel of experts."); Yossi Yonah, Well-Being
Categorical Deprivation and Pleasure, 28 PHILOSOPHIA 233, 243 (2001).
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serious illness, transforms lives" and that although "no one would
choose to suffer the transformation, those different lives are just
that-different, neither better nor worse."135 Yet this does not mean
that transformative injuries do not harm their victims. People are not
indifferent about undergoing these forms of transformation, nor
should they be.
Injuries that cause cognitive deficits are self-altering in the same
way as head injuries that cause aggression and antisocial behavior.
The self-altering aspect of head injury, then, helps clarify the
nonhedonic aspects of harm in these cases.
b. Physical Impairments
The concept of self-altering injury also helps to illuminate the
harms caused by physical injuries that lead to such outcomes as ampu-
tation, paraplegia, and chronic illness. Although these injuries do not
affect cognition and emotion in the same direct way that a head injury
might, they nonetheless have substantial psychological impact. "The
study of trauma does not lead to the conclusion that the self can be
identified with the body, but it does show how the body and one's
perception of it are nonetheless essential components of the self."1 36
There is a large literature detailing how people adapt to these
traumas. This literature confirms that there is a great deal of hedonic
adaptation.137 Yet it also highlights the transformative nature of this
adaptive process, and often does so with language that supports the
idea of self-altering injury. "Although the person who existed prior to
the injury continues to exist, such traumatic loss transforms individu-
als in an irreversible manner, meaning that the former self cannot be
fully recaptured."1 3 8 One prevalent model describes the process of
adaptation as a negotiation of a new self-concept: A recently impaired
person's self-concept swings (sometimes wildly) between "predis-
ability" and "postdisability" selves.139 Researchers speak of severe inju-
135 Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, and Ine-
galitarian (but Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 253, 277 (2006).
136 BRISON, supra note 1, at 46.
137 See supra Part L.A.
138 Kendall & Buys, supra note 4, at 17 (citation omitted).
139 Hanoch Livneh & Randall M. Parker, Psychological Adaptation to Disability: Perspectives
from Chaos and Complexity Theory, 49 REHABILITATION COUNSELING BULL. 17, 18 (2005)
(describing such "pendular models"); see also Kathy Charmaz, The Body, Identity, and Self
Adapting to Impairment, 36 Soc. Q. 657, 670 (1995) (discussing identity trade-offs); Judith A.
Howard, Social Psychology of Identities, 26 ANN. REv. Soc. 367, 368 (2000) (discussing the
alteration of "self-schemas," that is, "characteristics, preferences, goals, and behavior pat-
terns we [correctly or not] associate with ourselves"); Karen K. Yoshida, Reshaping of Self A
Pendular Reconstruction of Self and Identity Among Adults with Traumatic Spinal Cord Injury, 15
Soc. HEALTH & ILLNESs 217, 217, 223 (1993) (discussing the pendular nature of self-iden-




ries or chronic illness as causing a "loss of self' 140 or "biographical
disruption"1 41 that leads to a "changed person."142 Victims must go
through a process of "reintegrating the self" 43 to "recon-
struct . .. their changed selves."'"
When disability scholars talk of a predisability and postdisability
self, they are using "self' as shorthand to refer to a collection of char-
acteristics of the victim that we generally hold out as important for
personal identity. Talk of the postdisability self underscores the fact
that large changes in personal characteristics to which selves attach
great value often accompany disability. Understood in this way, disa-
bility scholars overwhelmingly argue that disabilities are self-altering.
Self-reports from disabled people confirm that adjusting to new
bodily limitations can sometimes be self-altering. For example, one
chronically ill patient stated: "I have no idea who I would be, in a way,
if I hadn't become diabetic ... Just to have to internalize this regime
must have made a great difference to my personality, I think." 45 S.
Kay Toombs, an emeritus philosophy professor, mirrors these senti-
ments when she describes her experience with multiple sclerosis:
When I see myself on a home video, I experience a sense of puzzle-
ment. I catch myself wondering not so much whether the body pro-
jected on the screen is my body but, rather, if the person in the
video is really me . .. [I] f I see old pictures of myself when I was
walking, or leaning on a cane, I find it hard to remember how it was
to be that person, or, even who I was when I moved like that.,4 6
140 Nick Watson, Well, I Know This is Going to Sound Very Strange to You, but I Don't See
Myself as a Disabled Person: Identity and Disability, 17 DISABXILYrr & Soc'v 509, 512-13 (2002)
("People who have an impairment or chronic condition . . . suffer a loss of self and go
through a process during which they negotiate their lives in such a way as to be as ordinary
as possible and so retain some contact with desired life-worlds."). Consistent with the pre-
dictions of hedonic adaptation, these changes are often evaluated positively: "[H]ad it not
been for my heart attack-I'm grateful it happened now, cause it changed my life consider-
ably and so [I] have a lack of words [to describe it]. Yeah, I thank my heart attack for that.
In one way I'm grateful." Kathy Charmaz, Identity Dilemmas of Chronically Ill Men, 35 Soc. Q
269, 275 (1994) (conducting qualitative interviews with twenty men and eighty women, all
with chronic illnesses).
141 See Simon J. Williams, Chronic Illness as Biographical Disruption or Biographical Disrup-
tion as Chronic Illness? Reflections on a Core Concept, 22 Soc. HEALTH & ILLNESS 40, 40 (2000).
142 Paul Menzel, Paul Dolan,Jeff Richardson & Jan Abel Olsen, The Role ofAdaptation to
Disability and Disease in Health State Valuation: A Preliminary Normative Analysis, 55 Soc. Sci. &
MED. 2149, 2153 (2002).
143 K. Whalley Hammell, Quality of Life After Spinal Cord Injury: A Meta-Synthesis of Quali-
tative Findings, 45 SPINAL CORD 124, 135 (2007).
144 S. Kay Toombs, Disability and the Self in CHANGING THE SELF: PHILOSOPHIES, TECH-
NIQUES, AND EXPERIENCES 337, 351 (Thomas M. Brinthaupt & Richard P. Lipka eds., 1994).
145 Charmaz, supra note 140, at 276 (emphasis omitted).
146 S. Kay Toombs, Reflections on Bodily Change: The Lived Experience ofDisability, in HAND-
BOOK OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND MEDICINE 247, 254 (S. Kay Toombs ed., 2001) (emphasis in
original).
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To be sure, not all patients will exhibit such alienation from their
past selves. As one paraplegic noted, "I'm the same person that I was
before the accident except that now I have to get around a little bit
differently."I 47 Like almost all areas of human experience, there is
heterogeneity in how people experience severe injury*14 8 Although
not all people will have a crisis of self-identity, 149 many will. And al-
though not all people will alter their ideals, goals, and preferences,
many will. The dramatic language of disability researchers combined
with autobiographical accounts of altered values suggest that these cri-
ses will often lead to a redefinition of one's ideals, goals, and
preferences.150
The process of adapting to disability often changes ideals, goals,
and preferences that were central to the victim's construction of her-
self. "All the things I thought were really important before, I now find
were not."15 1 Qualitative research into the process of adaptation "sug-
gests that people who make a good adjustment to the sudden onset of
impairment are those who are able to redefine their values, [and]
broaden the range of things that are cherished." 5 2 The many seque-
147 Patricia J. Manns & Karen E. Chad, Components of Quality of Life for Persons with a
Quadriplegic and Paraplegic Spinal Cord Injury, 11 QUALITATIVE HEALTH REs. 795, 802 (2001);
see also ERNEST A. HIRSCH, STARTING OVER 164-65 (1977) ("Whatever changes have oc-
curred in me do not touch the core of my 'self,' which has remained pretty much the same.
As far as other people are concerned, I think I've remained much as always. Although I
realize some changes have occurred, I feel a continuity with the past and have no difficulty
recognizing myself as myself, and neither does anyone else."); K. Whalley Hammell, Quality
ofLife Among People with High Spinal Cord Injury Living in the Community, 42 SPINAL CoRD 607,
612 (2004) ("The person you were pre-injury is the person you are going to be post-in-
jury-with different values . . . ."); id. at 613 ("1 don't really look at myself any different.").
148 See Kendall & Buys, supra note 4, at 18 ("Research has also indicated that there is
significant variation both within and across individuals in the speed and quality with which
individuals move through the adjustment process." (citation omitted)); Hanoch Livneh,
Sheri M. Lott & Richard F. Antonak, Patterns ofPsychosocial Adaptation to Chronic Illness and
Disability: A Cluster Analytic Approach, 9 PSYCHOL. HEALTH & MED. 411, 423 (2004) (describ-
ing heterogeneity in coping and adaptation to spinal cord injury).
149 Some may instead find that a disability does not substantially affect their ideals and
goals.
150 Much disability research focuses on the effects that disabilities have on general
mood (e.g., causing depression, anxiety, or aggressiveness), as opposed to cataloging the
specific changes in commitments that may have occurred. See, e.g., Kendall & Terry, supra
note 27, at 102-05 (noting that studies have demonstrated that closed head injury can
"have devastating consequences across a range of psychosocial domains"). Because self-
alteration is arguably more harmful when one's ideals change, future research should fo-
cus on the types of commitments that are altered by disability, and thereby more rigorously
test the assertion above that disability can lead to altered ideals and goals.
151 Christine Carpenter, The Experience ofSpinal Cord Injury: The Individual's Perspective-
Implications for Rehabilitation Practice, 74 PHYSICAL THERAPY 614, 622 (1994); see also Ham-
mell, supra note 143, at 133 ("By letting go of some 'I ams' (such as 'I am an athlete') and
developing others (such as 'I am a father'), a sense of self-worth was enhanced."); Ham-
mell, supra note 147, at 612 ("The person you were pre-injury is the person you are going
to be post-injury-with different values . . .
152 Hammell, supra note 143, at 135.
562
SELF-ALTERING INJURY
lae of severe impairment-such as financial instability, divorce, unem-
ployment, and social isolation153-further suggest that many people
who suffer impairments will also be forced to alter how they value
such basic things as independence, friendship, and sex.
2. Further Research on Self-Alteration
One set of recent studies examined subjects' responses to hypo-
thetical psychological traumas. These studies suggest that even in the
absence of physical harms, traumatic events have the potential to be
self-altering. 1 5 4 These studies use the term disconnectedness to describe
what this Article refers to as self-alteration. 15 5 This term is derived
from the philosophical work of Derek Parfit.156 Therefore, this sec-
tion will start with a brief overview of Parfit's arguments about the
nature of the self.
According to Parfit, people persist through time only as a matter
of degree.1 5 7 Therefore, the question of whether my future self will
be "me" cannot be definitively answered. Parfit uses the term "con-
nectedness" to describe this spectrum of similarity. 15 8 Parfit discusses
a number of hypothetical examples, most of which look like imagina-
tive science fiction scenarios. For example, he asks what we would
153 See Olga Horgan & Malcolm MacLachlan, Psychosocial Adjustment to Lower-Limb Am-
putation: A Review, 26 DISABiITly & REHABILITATION 837, 840 (2004) (collecting studies and
concluding that "many people without disabilities ignore those with disabilities for fear of
saying the wrong thing or because of experiencing general anxiety and unease in their
presence"); id. ("[A]lmost half of the participants visited friends and relatives less fre-
quently since their amputation and that approximately two-thirds were less likely to go to
the cinema, theatre, sport events, library, dances, and shows." (citing H. Burger & C.
Marincek, The Life Style of Young Persons After Lower Limb Amputation Caused by Injury, 21
PROSTHETICS & ORTHOTICS INT'L 35, 36 (1997)); Michael Kelly, Self Identity and Radical
Surgery, 14 Soc. HEALTH & ILLNESS 390, 404-06 (1992) (reporting interviews with people
needing colostomy bags that showed that many believed their disability made sexual rela-
tionships more difficult); see also Duggan & Dijkers, supra note 9, at 15 (reporting on cas-
cade effects of injury, which include fears of sexual rejection); Livneh et al., supra note 148,
at 415 (reporting that patients who suffer spinal cord injuries have high subjective well-
being in a number of areas, but low subjective well-being in employment, sex, and financial
situations).
154 See Daniel M. Bartels & Lance J. Rips, Psychological Connectedness and Intertemporal
Choice, 139 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 49, 51 (2010).
155 See id. at 50 (describing the concept of psychological connectedness).
156 See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 206 (1984).
157 See id. at 239-43.
158 Id. at 206, 277, 313. A clarifications is in order. Parfit uses the term Relation R to
discuss the ways in which people persist through time only as a matter of degree. Id. at
262. Parfit identifies two constituitive parts of Relation R connectedness and continuity.
Id. Continuity consists in "overlapping chains" of connectedness. Id. at 206. This article
focuses on connectedness rather than continuity because continuity is a function of con-
nectedness, and because Parfit's most relevant discussions involve connectedness. See also
David W. Shoemaker, Disintegrated Persons and Distributive Principles, 15 RATIO 58, 75 (2002)
("[O]f the two relations in Relation R we may plausibly believe that psychological connect-
edness is by far the more important.").
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conclude about personal identity if we could implant new memories,
new personality traits, new values, and new cells into people.'59 If we
slowly replaced your cells with new cells, and simultaneously replaced
your memories, values, and personality traits with those of Greta
Garbo, when would you cease to be you? At the beginning of the
procedure, all of the touchstones that we would look to in order to
determine identity suggest that you are unchanged, but at the end of
the potentially lengthy procedure, all of these touchstones suggest
that you no longer exist, and that instead Greta Garbo has been rein-
carnated. This reduces the plausibility of claiming that the patient is
always-in a deep and perfect sense-the same person. It is more
plausible that the unfortunate patient persists through time only as a
matter of degree.
Parfit is making a metaphysical claim that people are not constant
through time. Because many of our intuitions about moral responsi-
bility, self-interest, and survival are rooted in erroneous metaphysical
claims,160 Parfit argues that these intuitions are likely to be mislead-
ing.1 6 1 Parfit's metaphysical claims, and their purported normative
implications, have spawned a great deal of philosophical debate.16 2
The purpose of this Article is not to review these debates.
This Article (and the research discussed below) uses the concept
of connectedness metaphorically rather than metaphysically. Even
taken as a metaphor, Parfit's Greta Garbo example illustrates the im-
portance we attach to our personality traits and values and helps high-
light the intuition that we can be harmed if traumatic events disrupt
these values and personality traits.
Traumatic events have a large and immediate impact on connect-
edness. Subjects in one set of studies were asked to "think of the char-
acteristics that make you the person you are-your personality,
temperament, likes and dislikes, beliefs, values, ambitions, goals, ide-
als-and rate the degree of connectedness between the person you
expect to be in the future compared to the person you are
now . . . ."163 These subjects were then asked to consider vignettes
illustrating the life course of several fictional students. In each
vignette, a fictional student would experience life changes ten, twenty,
and thirty years into the future. 164 Some life changes were minor:
* "[D]evelop an acute sensitivity to pollen and . . . move to
Arizona";
159 PARFIT, supra note 156, at 237.
160 Id. at 323-30.
161 Id.
162 For a useful collection of essays illustrating this debate, see generally PERSONAL
IDENTITY (Raymond Martin & John Baressi eds., 2003).
163 Bartels & Rips, supra note 154, at 52.
164 Id. at 57-58.
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* "[D]evelop an affinity for rice-based dishes"; or
* "[L] eave [his or] her job for the same position (and salary) at
another employer."16 5
Other life changes were more momentous:
* "[R]eturn home after 12 months of private contracting work in a
war-torn region . . . where [he or she] saw terrifying and atro-
cious events unfold";
* "[R]eturn safely and in good health from a vacation in South
America where [he or she] had been kidnapped and imprisoned
as a political hostage for 6 months";
* "[B]uried by an avalanche during a skiing trip but will be res-
cued by the ski patrol and remain totally unharmed"; or
* "[R]eceive a diagnosis of pancreatic cancer but, soon after, will
be completely symptom-free and learn that the initial test results
were incorrect . . . ."166
Subjects were then asked to rate the degree of connectedness between
the fictional student today, and the fictional student in fifteen, twenty-
five, and thirty-five years.16 7 When the vignettes described one of the
small changes, subjects reported high degrees of connectedness.1 6 8
When the vignettes described large changes, subjects reported low de-
grees of connectedness.169
This research also provided evidence that these measures of con-
nectedness were meaningful. In addition to rating the fictitious stu-
dents' connectedness with their future selves, the subjects made a
series of investing decisions. 170 They were instructed to make these
decisions as if they were the fictional character.1 7 1 When subjects pre-
dicted steep declines in connectedness at some future time, they pre-
ferred to shift rewards to the pretrauma period. 7 2 They became less
willing to sacrifice pretrauma money for posttrauma money.1 7 3 The
various small life changes that fictional students would experience
had no effect on investment choices.1 7 4 These patterns remained
165 Id. at 68.
166 Id.; see also id. at 61.
167 Id. at 58.
168 See id. at 59-60.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 58.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 64 ("When people anticipate an important change that might weaken the
psychological bonds between their present and future selves, they want upcoming desirable
events to happen before the change occurs.").
173 Id.
174 In addition to studying traumatic events, this study also asked subjects to consider a
fictional student who would undergo a "religious conversion-will be introduced into a
new faith and will find spiritual fulfillment in [his or her] God," id. at 68, and would "find
out that he was adopted." Id. at 61. Subjects treated these conditions much like they did
the other large life events: kidnapping, witnessing war, avalanches, and erroneous cancer
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even after controlling for anticipated changes in the fictional stu-
dent's marginal utility of money and perceived likelihood that future
payoffs would actually occur.175
In a companion study, the authors also found the same pattern
when subjects were asked to choose how many vacation days to allo-
cate to the pre- and posttrauma time period.176 The choice of when
to assign vacation days was affected by the large life changes, but not
affected by the small life changes.177 When subjects anticipated a
large life event, they tended to shift vacation days to the pretrauma
time period.178 Similarly, subjects tended to shift extra work days to
the posttrauma period. 179
Taken together these results support the notion that trauma can
lead people to feel deeply alienated from their pretrauma selves.
When subjects considered the possibility that the "the characteristics
that make you the person you are" will change based on some trau-
matic event, they did not merely lament the possible change. Instead,
they appeared not to fully recognize the resulting persons as fully
themselves. They were hesitant to take on burdens to benefit this re-
sulting person, and eager to benefit their current selves even if it
meant shifting burdens to their future selves. The degree of aliena-
tion was so great, therefore, that it affected subjects' basic concept of
self-interest.
This evidence is far from dispositive. Much work remains to be
done in corroborating the above findings and expanding them to dif-
ferent populations. But the research is intriguingly suggestive. It
lends support for the descriptive claim that traumatic events change
"the characteristics that make you the person you are-your personal-
ity, temperament, likes and dislikes, beliefs, values, ambitions, goals,
[and] ideals."180
3. The Relationship Between Hedonic Adaptation and Self-Alteration
The set of injuries that are self-altering is likely to overlap with the
set of injuries that might produce damages for loss of enjoyment of
life. And the degree of self-alteration is likely to be a function of the
diagnoses. Subjects reported low levels of connectedness between the fictional student
now and the student after he converted or learned he was adopted. Subjects were also
hesitant to shift money from the preconversion student to the postconversion student, and
from the pre-adoption-revelation self to the post-adoption-revelation-self. Id. at 59, 61.
175 Id. at 60-61.
176 Id. at 62-63.
177 Id. at 63.
178 1&
179 Id.
180 Id. at 52.
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degree of hedonic adaptation. Every adult has goals.181 When they
meet these goals, they feel pride. Every adult has ideals. If they do
not live up to these ideals, they feel guilt and disappointment. Every
adult has preferences. When they satisfy these preferences, they be-
come happy. Disabilities of greater severity disrupt these goals, ideals,
and preferences to a larger degree; they create more significant con-
straints on leading the same life that a victim led prior to the disabil-
ity. 182 As discussed above, this normally creates significant
psychological distress.183 The process of hedonic adaptation amelio-
rates this distress, but it does so at a cost. That cost is self-alteration.
In the words of one paralysis patient:
It was more like those things not only didn't matter any more, they
wouldn't have mattered even if I could still have done them. I
didn't need to be able to do them-or to mourn their loss-in order
to maintain some image of myself.184
Adaptation often "works by transforming what one values and en-
joys."18 5 To the extent that at least some goals, ideals and preferences
can be said to be fundamental aspects of an individual's self-identity,
then adaptation will alter this identity. The postdisability self will not
be fully connected to the predisability self. Therefore, hedonic adap-
tation is at least partially dependent on self-alteration. 186
On any given metric of the good, this change may be for the bet-
ter or for the worse. Regardless, the transformation is almost certainly
a harm from the perspective of the predisability self. Hedonic adapta-
tion does not take account of the fact that the sources of happiness
have changed for many tort victims. Yet exercising some autonomous
control over these sources of happiness, especially the sources of our
181 This Article focuses solely on people who have ideals and goals that constitute an
ongoing life project. I refer to these people simply as "adults." The concept of self-altera-
tion would have to be altered to accommodate injuries to children, who probably do not
have set ideals or goals. It is also possible that the phenomenon of hedonic adaptation
works differently in children than in adults.
182 See Menzel et al., supra note 142, at 2151 ("Realizing that a disease or disability is
likely to be chronic, people may adjust their activities.... People may adjust not only the
activities they select to pursue their goals, but the content and direction of the goals them-
selves. Their basic interests can change. A paraplegic, for example, may develop an inter-
est in music to replace a previous interest in physical activity.").
183 See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
184 Bagenstos & Schlanger supra note 2, at 764 (citing Carolyn L. Vash, The Psychology of
Disability, 22 REHABIITATION PSYCHOL. 145, 153 (1975), as reprinted in CAROLYN L. VASH &
NANcY M. CREWE, PSYCHOLOGY OF DisABiLrIY 160 (2d ed. 2004)).
185 Id. at 768.
186 Menzel et al., supra note 142, at 2151 ("The primary meaning of 'adapt' appropri-
ate for the present context of disability and chronic illness is 'to adjust oneself to new or
changed circumstances.' This can be articulated even more specifically as changing 'oneself
so that one's behavior, attitudes, etc. will conform to new ... circumstances.' . . . [T]he




pride, is constitutive of our self-identity. If we change the sources of
our happiness and pride, we have changed ourselves. If we are forced
to alter these aspects of ourselves against our will, then we are
harmed. We can be forced to alter ourselves because severe disability
can require a choice between two unpleasant fates. We can either
maintain our original ideals and risk not living up to them, or we can
give up the ideals that, at least in part, made us who we were. A newly
disabled parent, for example, may have to adjust her ideals of being a
perfect caregiver and accept ideals that allow her to receive care as
well.
Hedonic measures cannot detect these changes. Hedonic adap-
tation research misses the fact that the source of one's happiness mat-
ters. And it matters because some sources of happiness are intimately
tied into self-identity.
C. Forced Self-Alteration Is a Harm
This Article offers a different solution to Ubel and Loewenstein's
puzzle 87: potential tort victims are harmed because their personal
identity does not emerge from the injury fully intact. The harm stem-
ming from this alteration can be expressed in terms of connectedness,
"narrativity," or constraints on autonomy: victims are harmed because
they are not fully connected to the person that adapts to the injury,
they cannot tell a coherent narrative that preserves the unity of their
lives, or because disabilities constrain their ability to choose and main-
tain a set of ideals, goals, and preferences. These various explanations
of the harm all pick up on a commonsense observation: some of our
psychological characteristics are so fundamental to our identity that
changing them changes us.
1. Harm as the Disruption of a Coherent Life Narrative
One of the most popular accounts of the self among philoso-
phers, psychologists, and anthropologists is the "narrative" account of
the self.188 These accounts suggest that people can change over time
and that these changes are relevant to a host of normative conclu-
sions, including determinations of harm.
Alasdair MacIntyre argues that we understand ourselves only in
terms of self-stories that link together the disparate events in our lives
187 See Ubel and Loewenstein, supra note 2, at S205. Even after being convinced that
major injuries will not affect their long-term happiness, Ubel and Loewenstein remain con-
vinced that many tort victims sustain substantial harm. They seek to resolve this puzzle by
arguing that harm should not be defined solely by happiness and should instead account
for lost capabilities.
188 See VALERIE GRAY HARDCAsTLE, CONSTRUCTING THE SELF 18 (2008); Dan P. McAd-
ams, The Problem Of Narrative Coherence, 19 J. CONSTRUCTIVIST PSYCHOL. 109, 109-10 (2006).
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into a story or narrative. 89 He begins by arguing that we cannot un-
derstand humans, and humans cannot understand themselves, with-
out understanding their actions.190 The only way to make human
action intelligible is within a temporal context that accounts for the
reasons that gave rise to the action.' 9 ' To illustrate this, MacIntyre
asks how we might respond to the question, "What is he doing?"192
We could answer this question with a single word such as "digging,"
but this would hardly exhaust the information that we sought in ask-
ing our question. When we ask, "What is he doing?" we are most often
seeking information that will allow us to make sense of the action.193
In order to make sense of human actions, we need to understand the
actor's intentions.194 For example, someone may be "digging" in or-
der to "find treasure" in order to "become rich." Another may be
"digging" in order to "find treasure" in order to "solve a great histori-
cal mystery." These two sets of intentions paint different pictures of
the action and the actors, and the differences stem from different
long-term objectives.19 5 Notice that this information about intention
gives our explanation directionality. We are constructing a story that
orients toward an end.19 6 Even with an understanding of where the
story is going, our ability to make sense of an action will be incom-
plete without an understanding of its history and context.197 We use
the medium of stories to combine this historical information with in-
formation on the intent of the actor in order to make sense of actions.
In short, we make sense of actions by placing them within a tempo-
rally extended narrative that has a beginning, middle, and end. We
use this narrative form to make the actions of others, and ourselves,
intelligible. Our self-narratives provide unity to our lives by organiz-
ing their disparate events into coherent stories that involve movement
toward (or away from) some goal or good.198 MacIntyre refers to this
unifying narrative as a "quest" to work out our what we value in life
and to find our place within that conception of value.' 99
189 See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 191-92 (1981).
190 See id. at 194-96.
191 See id.
192 Id. at 192.
193 See id. at 192, 194-95.
194 See id. at 192-93.
195 See id. at 193 ("[Blehaviour is only characterised adequately when we know what
the longer and longest-term intentions invoked are . . . .").
196 See id. at 200-01 ("There is no present which is not informed by some image of
some future and an image of the future which always presents itself in the form of a
telos ... towards which we are either moving or failing to move in the present.").
197 See id. at 199 ("The notion of a history is as fundamental a notion as the notion of
an action. Each requires the other.").




Charles Taylor has also argued that we make sense of ourselves
only through narratives. As discussed in more detail above, he has
argued that we cannot conceive of a person who has no framework of
values. 200 Such a person would have no way to give meaning to any of
her life; no act would be worth doing.201 This person would at best be
highly damaged and pathological. 202 When we refer to selves or per-
sons, therefore, we are necessarily referring to beings with (however
rough and contradictory) conceptions of the good. If someone has a
conception of the good, then by definition, she cannot be indifferent
to whether her life is heading toward that good or away from it.203
Thus, selves necessarily develop a temporal understanding of how
their life has unfolded so far and whether their life is heading toward
the good or away from it.204 The only way to gain this temporal un-
derstanding is by constructing a self-narrative that links disparate
events in one's life into a coherent story that has a beginning, middle,
and end.205
Self-narratives are endemic. "The connection between past and
present is a fundamental component of human experi-
ence... . [O]ur drive to understand ourselves in terms of our past is
the basic scaffolding of our psychological lives." 206 Instead of seeing
our lives as a jumbled collection of unrelated experiences, we organ-
ize this collection into a story. This story relates individual exper-
iences to one another, and creates patterns within a set of
remembered actions, emotions, and thoughts. 207
The narrative view allows for selves to change over time to greater
and lesser degrees. Self-narratives are constantly changing because
200 See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
201 See TAYLOR, supra note 108, at 31.
202 Id. at 31.
203 See id. at 47.
204 Id. at 46-47.
205 See id. at 47.
206 HARDCASTLE, supra note 188, at 30 ("[We are] driven to tell narratives .... This is
something we cannot help but do, for it is the only way we have of understanding our-
selves."); see also DANIEL C. DENNETr, CONSCIOUSNESs EXPLAINED 418 (1991); TAYLOR, sufra
note 108, at 48; John Barresi, On Becoming a Person, 12 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 79, 91 (1999) ("From
a phenomenological perspective, it does not matter whether this self that we attribute iden-
tity to through time is metaphysically real or mere psychological fiction, what matters is
that it is essential to our phenomenology of self. . .").
207 Arguably, evolutionary pressures have hardwired these tendencies into all humans.
See Shaun Gallagher, Philosophical Conceptions of the Self? Implications for Cognitive Science, 4
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 14, 19 (2000) ("[W]e cannot prevent ourselves from 'inventing' our
selves. We are hardwired to become language users, and once we are caught up in the web
of language and begin spinning our own stories, we are not totally in control of the prod-
uct."); see also DENNETr, supra note 206, at 10-11.
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narratives seek to provide a coherent story.208 When someone learns
something new about herself, this new information may or may not fit
well with her existing narrative. 209 If it does not fit well, she may seek
to reinterpret the new information in a way that is consistent with her
existing narrative. But if this is not possible, she may have to alter her
narrative. Although self-narratives are active creations, to call them
"fiction" is to understate their importance under the narrative view.210
These narratives provide the necessary means through which we un-
derstand ourselves as agents.
Although self-narratives evolve over time, the thought of forced
changes in their self-narrative rightly distresses people. Again con-
sider Parfit's Greta Garbo hypothetical. 211 Here, we recoil against the
possibility that we would lose our ideals and goals. We recoil further
from the thought that another person's ideals and goals will replace
our own. Consider another example, offered by David DeGrazia:
"Suppose one is presented with a choice between dying soon or surviv-
ing with the capacity to experience and act ... . [Blut [with] such
severe memory loss that one would be unable to remember the previ-
ous day, . . . [or] plan more than a few minutes into the future." 212
Many people would think the term "surviving" in DeGrazia's example
is merely technical. Something very important is lost. This person has
lost the ability to hold long-term ideals and goals. These ideals and
goals gave our self-narrative its directionality and allowed us to judge
whether our lives had value. Without-these ideals and goals, life could
not have meaning.
When someone complains . .. that his or her life is meaningless, he
or she is often and perhaps characteristically complaining that the
narrative of their life has become unintelligible to them, that it lacks
any point, any movement toward a climax or a telos. Hence the
point of doing any one thing rather than another at crucial junc-
tures in their lives seems to such a person to have been lost.213
208 SCHECHTMAN, supra note 107, at 98; Catriona Mackenzie, Personal Identity, Narrative
Integration, and Embodiment, in EMBODIMENT AND AGENCY 100, 107 (Sue Campbell et al. eds.,
2009).
209 One scholar uses the example of a woman who thinks of herself as ugly, but then
begins to evaluate the evidence in the mirror. See Roy SCHAFER, RETELLING A LIFE 10
(1992).
210 Daniel C. Dennett, The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity, in SELF AND CONSCIOUS-
NESS: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES 103, 106-07 (Frank S. Kessel et al. eds., 1992) (noting that
the concept of a self that is created through narrative is similar to abstract concepts in
physics like centers of gravity-both are fictions, but both are extremely useful in trying to
understand the object of study). For discussions of the constraints that culture puts on an
individual's self-narrative, see DEGRAZIA, supra note 100, at 84-86, SCHAFER, supra note 209,
at 53-55, and SCHECHTMAN, supra note 107, at 95.
211 See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
212 DEGRAZIA, supra note 100, at 80.
213 MAcINTYRE, supra note 189, at 202.
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In summary, this person has lost the ability to join the discrete events
in her life into a coherent temporally extended story. This example
suggests that people assign intrinsic value to their self-narratives, and
wish to retain as much control as possible over how they unfold.2 14
Under the narrative view of identity that MacIntyre and Taylor
espouse, disruptions to one's self-narrative can constitute harms. Disa-
bilities often create such disruptions. They often disrupt people's ide-
als and goals and leave them without a clear vision of where their life
is heading. Such disruptions hinder the creation of a coherent and
unified life narrative. As S. Kay Toombs illustrated above, severe disa-
bility can sometimes prevent one from seeing one's life as a coherent
whole. 2 15 Disability threatens to create an enduring disconnect be-
tween predisability lives and postdisability lives. Marya Schechtman,
another proponent of the narrative view of self, has summed up these
arguments in this way:
We often describe . .. people as having 'lost their identities,' say that
they 'are no longer the same person,' that 'the person we knew is
gone,' and so on. My suggestion is that these statements need not
be considered entirely metaphorical. ... [W]hat the addict, pris-
oner of war, or abused spouse is being robbed of is, in a very real
sense, his or her life.216
Large changes in one's physical capacities are particularly likely
to require large changes to one's self-narrative or create breaks in
one's unified life story. Some narrative theorists claim that all humans
understand themselves, at least in part, as their physical body.217 Our
perceptions and engagement with the world are structured through
our bodies.218 Because our self-narratives arise within this embodied
context, it should not be surprising that bodily capacities form the
"background conditions for the ongoing unity and intelligibility of
our lives."219 Because injuries that decrease physical capacities disrupt
a foundational aspect of self-narratives, we should expect that these
injuries will be particularly harmful because they will be particularly
disruptive to one's self-narrative. 220
214 See DEGRAZIA, supra note 100, at 80-82, 89, 107.
215 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
216 SCHECHTMAN, supra note 107, at 88 (emphasis in original).
217 Mackenzie, supra note 208, at 114 ("[A] condition of possibility of this narrative is
that we have an integrated . .. conception of ourselves as embodied agents.").
218 See id. at 116.
219 Id. at 118.
220 HowARD BRODY, STORIES OF SicKNEss 2 (2003) ("[Tlhe appearance of the sickness
marks a radical redirection of the trajectory of the life story.").
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2. Harm as a Constraint on Autonomy
One way that we exercise autonomy is to choose our own ideals
and goals. For ease of exposition, this section will refer to these col-
lectively as one's "commitments." We are inevitably constrained in the
choice of our commitments by social forces. These endemic con-
straints are not harms from the point of view of tort law. Yet some
additional constraints on the choice and maintenance of commit-
ments can constitute harms. Disabilities can create these types of ad-
ditional constraints.
The term autonomy has multiple meanings. 221 Joel Feinberg iden-
tifies four main uses of the term: the capacity to govern oneself, the
accomplishment of self-governance to a greater or lesser degree, an
ideal that values such self-governance, or sovereignty over oneself.2 2 2
The conceptual core of all of these meanings is arguably the notion of
self-determination.2 2 3 People are self-determined when they reflect
upon and choose their commitments, and are not merely conduits for
the commitments of their parents or their culture. 224 Another way to
phrase this idea is that people choose their own commitments, or are
the author of those commitments. 225
This Article is most concerned with autonomy as the achievement
of self-determination, although it also argues that self-determination is
221 See DWORIN, supra note 103, at 6 ("'[A]utonomy' is used in an exceedingly broad
fashion. ... About the only features held constant from one author to another are that
autonomy is a feature of persons and that it is a desirable quality to have."); JOEL FEINBERG,
supra note 101, at 27-51 (1986) (describing four common meanings of "autonomy" and
listing twelve sub-aspects of one of them). For another comprehensive account of auton-
omy, see generally THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDuAL AUTONOMY, supra note 129,
passim. For a discussion of the closely related concept of freedom, see generally TIM GRAY,
FREEDOM (1991) (attempting to define freedom and the core meaning attendant to all of
its different usages).
222 FEINBERG, supra note 101, at 28.
223 See Christman, supra note 129, at 3, 5-6 (suggesting that self-governance is the con-
ceptual core of Feinberg's list, and that self-determination is at the core of self-govern-
ance); see also Robert Young, Autonomy and the "Inner Sel " in THE INNER CrrADEL: ESSAYS ON
INDIVIDUAL AuTrONouv, supra note 129, at 77, 78 ("[T]o exercise one's freedom in such a
way as to order one's life according to a plan or conception which fully expresses one's
own choices .. . is the heart of our notion of autonomy.").
224 SeeFEINBERG, supra note 101, at 33-35; see also GRAY, supra note 221, at 52. In Rich-
ard Fallon's terminology, self-determination is a descriptive rather than ascriptive sense of
autonomy. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REv. 875, 877-78
(1994) (defining descriptive autonomy as "the extent to which they are meaningfully 'self-
governed' in a universe shaped by causal forces"). "Descriptive autonomy gives us a war-
ranted sense that our lives are at least partly of our own making, not the mere product of
external forces. It also provides the foundation for pride and satisfaction in a life well-
lived." Id. at 899.
225 See FEINBERG, supra note 101, at 33; JOSEPH RAz, THE MoRALrIY OF FREEDOM 369
(1986).
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valuable. Self-determination can occur to a greater or lesser degree 226
and is closely related to the concept of authenticity.2 2 7 A commitment
is authentically one's own to the degree to which one identifies with it,
takes ownership of it, endorses it, or adopts it for reasons of one's
own. These different verbal formulations have slightly different impli-
cations for the concept of authenticity, 2 2 8 but these differences are
not relevant here. These formulations capture a rough intuition that
one can author, at least partially, one's own commitments. 229
People are never fully self-determined or fully unconstrained au-
thors of themselves. Ideals and goals do not spring from rational de-
liberation fully formed. We are born without language and without
reason, which provide the basic tools for self-determination. Our ear-
liest beliefs are implanted in us and not seriously questioned, and are
therefore not authentically our own.23 0 But our capacity to reason
and critically reflect on our ideals and goals normally increases with
maturity.23' The movement from childhood to adulthood moves us
closer to the ideal of self-determination. 232 But even adults will never
be fully (or perhaps even substantially) self-determined. The process
of learning a particular language forms a foundation for our capacity
for reason, but also constrains this capacity.23 3 Cultural forces con-
tinue to play a large and often unexamined role in setting our ideals
226 RAz, supra note 225, at 372; Fallon, supra note 224, at 877 (arguing that descriptive
autonomy is a matter of degree and depends in part on the number of options available).
This Article sets aside the question of whether determinism undermines the possibility of
free will and hence undermines self-determination. For a discussion of these issues and a
defense of the possibility of self-determination, see DEGRAZIA, supra note 100, at 89-106.
227 FEINBERG, supra note 101, at 33 ("A person is authentic to the extent that .... [H]e
can and does alter his convictions for reasons of his own. . . ."); GRAY, supra note 221, at 53.
228 For a brief overview of the potential differences between some of these formula-
tions see Christman, supra note 129, at 6-7.
229 RAz, supra note 225, at 369 ("The autonomous person is a (part) author of his own
life. The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some degree,
their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives."); Ger-
ald Dworkin, The Concept ofAutonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTON-
omw, supra note 129, at 54, 60 ("It is only when a person identifies with the influences that
motivate him, assimilates them to himself ... that these influences are to be identified as
'his.'").
230 FEINBERG, supra note 101, at 34.
231 See id. at 34-37.
232 Daniel R. Williams, Mitigation and the Capital Defendant Who Wants to Die: A Study in
the Rhetoric of Autonomy and the Hidden Discourse of Collective Responsibility, 57 HASTINGs L.J.
693, 709 (2006) ('The healthy individual's acquisition of greater and greater responsibility
as he or she moves through adolescence into adulthood cultivates the capacity and the
freedom to navigate through life, through the various institutional, social, political, circum-
stantial forces that are often beyond the individual's immediate control. The sacredness of
the navigation resides in the importance it bears in bringing thematic unity, coherence,
and integrity to living.").
233 Cf GRAY, supra note 221, at 35 (noting that if a person were completely free to
choose her own language, she would be unable to express herself); H. J. McCloskey, A
Critique ofthe Ideals ofLiberty, 74 MIND 483, 486-87 (1965) (describing liberty as noninterfer-
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and goals. 2 3 4 For instance, the freedom to become an advocate of
murder, rape, and genocide is severely constrained in our society.2 3 5
Most of us instead make choices from a smaller set of options that are
compatible with prevailing moral beliefs. Even within this smaller set,
self-determination is constrained. For example, the pervasive sociali-
zation surrounding gender roles yields a qualified or restricted form
of self-determination.23 6
The existence of these constraints does not rob the concept of
self-determination of meaning. We can still sensibly talk about people
who are more self-determined than others-people who have settled
on a set of ideals and goals in a more deliberative and self-reflective
fashion.23 7 Although we cannot question all of our values at once
(else we would have no fixed point from which to judge them), we can
reevaluate values piecemeal and make progress toward identifying
with or rejecting our commitments.238
Autonomy, understood as self-determination, is an element of
welfare.239 The idea of being able to author your own commitments is
deeply ingrained in pretheoretic intuitions of the good life. Without
self-determination, we would merely be conduits for the commitments
of others or random causal processes beyond our control. To have
any control over the direction of one's life, one needs to have some
role in authoring one's commitments. Self-determination is so deeply
rooted in our concept of the good that it has been used to justify
ence and noting that limits to noninterference with certain aspects of life may be impor-
tant to maximize liberty generally).
234 See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY
RIGHTS 126 (1995) ("[T]he context of individual choice is the range of options passed
down to us by our culture. Deciding how to lead our lives is, in the first instance, a matter
of exploring the possibilities made available by our culture."); Dworkin, supra note 229, at
54, 58 ("We know that all individuals have a history. They develop socially and psychologi-
cally in a given environment with a set of biological endowments. They mature slowly and
are, therefore, heavily influenced by parents, peers, and culture."); Diana T. Meyers, Per-
sonal Autonomy and the Paradox of Feminine Socialization, 84J. PHIL. 619, 622-24 (1987) (high-
lighting the role of gender in constructing values).
235 See FEINBERG, supra note 101, at 38-39.
236 See Meyers, supra note 234, at 624.
237 FEINBERc, supra note 101, at 32 ("To the degree to which a person is autonomous
he is not merely the mouthpeice of other persons or forces. Rather his tastes, opinions,
ideals, goals, values, and preferences are all authentically his.").
238 See WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 50 (1989).
239 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 48-51 (1974) (arguing that peo-
ple give meaning to their lives by carrying out a life plan); RAz, supra note 225, at 370,
400-29; Kenneth J. Arrow, A Note on Freedom and flexibility, in CHOICE, WELFARE AND DEVEL,
OPMENT 7, 7-16 (K. Basu et al. eds., 1995). The capabilities approach, too, recognizes the
value of self-determination. One of the fundamental capabilities on Nussbaum's objective
list is Practical Reason. NUSSBAUM, supra note 70, at 82. This includes the freedom and
opportunity to develop one's own sense of the good. Id. Practical reason is, for Nussbaum,
one of the two most fundamental capabilities. Id.
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foundational commitments such as freedom of speech and freedom
of religion.2 4 0
Authoring one's commitments would be of little use without the
freedom to maintain those commitments. Self-determination does
not happen at one isolated time. It is a continual process of reflection
that leads to the endorsement and rejection of commitments. 2 4 1 The
accomplishment of authoring one's own commitments and the free-
dom to revise or maintain those commitments are necessarily related.
Self-determination, therefore, requires that people have the freedom
to maintain (or revise) their existing commitments.
Constraints on the freedom to maintain one's commitments are
harms.242 Just as one is never fully self-determined, one is never fully
free to maintain one's commitments. We can condemn some con-
straints on this freedom and sensibly refer to them as harms to the
person so constrained. Not all constraints are as endemic as immatur-
ity and basic processes of socialization. Some are more targeted, such
as oppression, coercion, manipulation, and deception. These con-
straints are harms because they reduce the victim's options and set
back the victim's pursuit of her preferences.243 Similarly, constraints
240 SeeJOHN GRAY, LIBERALIsM 60 (1986); David A.J. Richards, Autonomy in Law, in THE
INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY, supra note 129, at 246, 246; Gidon Sapir,
Religion and State-A Fresh Theoretical Start, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 579, 609 (1999). Auton-
omy can also provide a reason to give preference-satisfaction moral weight; if preferences
are not somehow your own, then it is less clear why it would be wrong or harmful to
prevent you from satisfying them. See Christman, supra note 129, at 19.
241 FEINBERG, supra note 101, at 35-37.
242 This Article does not take a position on whether constraints that only remove mor-
ally repugnant options can constitute harms. Raz qualified his valorization of autonomy by
arguing that autonomy only contributes to well-being if it is used to pursue the good. RAz,
supra note 225, at 381. Similarly, Nussbaum and Sen argue that capabilities to do evil are
not valuable. See NUSSBAUM, supfa note 70, at 83 ("Not all actual human abilities exert a
moral claim [to be given the opportunity to develop], only the ones that have been evalu-
ated as valuable from an ethical viewpoint. (The capacity for cruelty, for example, does
not figure on the list [of fundamental capabilities].)"); id. at 81 (noting that capabilities
are valuable when they are used to choose lives that people "have reason to value"); SEN,
supra note 80, at 65 (noting that freedom is reduced by eliminating options that a people
have "reasonably defendable" preferences for). This Article presumes that the vast major-
ity of commitments that tort victims hold are not morally repugnant or evil. RAZ, supra
note 225, at 381 ("A moral theory which recognizes the value of autonomy inevitably up-
holds a pluralistic view. It admits the value of a large number of greatly differing pursuits
among which individuals are free to choose."). Therefore, constraints on maintaining
these commitments can count as harms regardless of whether all or only some constraints
on autonomy cause harm.
243 RAZ, supra note 225, at 413 ("Depriving a person of opportunities or of the ability
to use them is a way of causing him harm."). Stephen Perry asks us to consider a Miss
America contestant who is kidnapped and prevented from competing. See Stephen Perry,
Harm, History, and Counterfactuals, 40 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1283, 1292-93 (2003). According
to Perry, she is harmed because her kidnappers have robbed her of an opportunity to
compete. Id. In Joel Feinberg's terminology, she has been harmed because her interest in
competing has been thwarted. JOEL FEINBERG, 1 THE MORAL LIMrTs OF THE CRIMINAL LAw:
HARM TO OTHERS 92-93 (1984). As an aside, this Article does not take a position on
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on the freedom to maintain one's commitments are harms because
they create a setback to one's interest in self-determination.
Again, head injury cases provide the simplest illustration of harm-
ful constraints on one's opportunity to maintain one's commitments.
As discussed above, head injuries often produce sudden and drastic
changes in personality. The sudden and drastic nature of the changes
strongly suggests that the changes are not the result of rational delib-
eration. Instead, these changes appear largely determined by the biol-
ogy of the brain. If anything, the term "constraint" appears to
underestimate the degree to which a head injury can reduce one's
opportunity to maintain prior commitments. It might be more accu-
rate to say that some of these injuries deterministically prevent the
maintenance of prior commitments. Nonetheless, the more genera-
lized concept of a constraint is sufficient to explain the harm in these
cases.
Physical disabilities can create constraints on self-determination
that have effects over and above those created by the endemic con-
straints of immaturity and socialization. Disabilities impose con-
straints on one's ability to exercise physical agency. This is certainly a
harm. But as Part III.B.1 illustrated, this is not all they do. They can
cause disruptions to the set of commitments with which the victim
previously identified. Disabilities have the potential to make former
ideals and goals more difficult to achieve. This can put severe pres-
sure on these commitments and force people to modify them in often
substantial ways. Seana Shiffrin defines harm as "the imposition of a
state or condition that directly or indirectly obstructs, prevents, frus-
trates, or undoes an agent's . . . efforts to fashion a life . . . that is
distinctively and authentically hers."244 This is exactly what the forced
self-alterations that sometimes accompany disability do: they frustrate
a victim's past efforts to fashion a life by disrupting the continued
viability of her previous ideals and goals.
The fact that hedonic adaptation leads people to alter their com-
mitments suggests that the constraints are severe. Constraints are
matters of degree. As the costs of maintaining one's commitments
increase, one's freedom to maintain those commitments becomes
whether constraints caused by cultural or economic forces-as opposed to individual tor-
tious conduct-should be labeled "harms." But using the term harm in these cases is cer-
tainly comprehensible, and is not obviously misplaced. For discussions of similar debates
about the proper scope of the term "freedom," see Felix Oppenheim, 'Constraints on Free-
dom' as a Descriptive Concept, 95 ETHics 305, 305-06 (1985). A further clarification may be
in order here. This Article does provide an account of which human actions trigger tort
liability. It relies on existing tort doctrine to make this determination, and focuses on the
harms that result from these actions.
244 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance
of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117, 123-24 (1999).
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more constrained. 245 This spectrum of constraints leads to line-draw-
ing problems. Some constraints will be too small to be worth taking
account of in tort law. But people do not abandon their authentic
commitments easily. By definition, people have strong desires to
maintain their authentic commitments. To identify with a commit-
ment is to endorse and integrate it within one's self-concept. To
change it requires a change to this self-concept. Someone may want
to be the type of person who travels the world on a whim, with mini-
mal planning. Someone else may want to be the type of person who
will never be reliant on others, and instead will be fiercely indepen-
dent. Yet another person may want to be the type of person who
earns a living by performing outdoor manual labor. Whatever the
ideal, whatever the goal, these commitments constitute the yardsticks
that they will use to judge whether their lives are going well or not.
One cannot choose to identify with these commitments while simulta-
neously remaining neutral to whether they are worthy pursuits. Simi-
larly, one cannot be neutral as to whether they should persist through
time.
An analysis of the options open to many victims of severe disabil-
ity confirms that the disabilities constrain their freedom to maintain
their previous commitments. Such a victim can choose between two
unpleasant fates. She can maintain her original ideals and risk falling
short of them, or she can alter those ideals to better fit with what she
perceives her new situation will allow her to accomplish. Maintaining
one's previous commitments can be extremely costly. Spinal cord in-
juries, for example, are often profoundly disruptive to the victim's life
in a way that calls into question whether, postinjury, they can lead a
life that is worthy of living from the point of view of their preinjury
commitments. Fifty percent of patients who have experienced a spi-
nal cord injury report suicidal thoughts. 2 4 6 Actual suicide rates after
spinal cord injury are three to five times higher than similarly situated
people without such injuries. 247 In the words of one victim: "Before
245 See S. I. Benn & W. L. Weinstein, BeingFree to Act, and Being a Free Man, 80 MIND 194,
208-09 (1971) (arguing that the cost of acting is relevant to determining whether someone
is "free" to do so); Oppenheim, supra note 243, at 305, 307-08 (discussing "practical impos-
sibility" in the context of defining freedom); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and
Death, 72 U. CHi. L. REV. 537, 565 (2005) ("[W]hen people have few or bad options, their
choices might not count as voluntary.").
246 Andreas Hartkopp et al., Suicide in a Spinal Cord Injured Population: Its Relation to
Functional Status, 79 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. REHABILITATION 1356, 1356 (1998).
247 See id. at 1356, 1358 (summarizing previous studies finding that victims of spinal
cord injury have suicide rates 3.3-4.9 times greater than the general population, and re-
porting a suicide rate from a Danish sample that was 4.6 times higher than the general
population, controlling for gender, age, and year); RJ Soden et al., Causes of Death After
Spinal Cord Injury, 38 SPINAL CORD 604, 605 (2000) (reporting suicide rates for an Austra-




the accident I was happy and life was good. The injury and everything
that has happened since has choked any life and happiness out of me.
I have nothing now . . . . Am nothing. . . . My life is in dark-
ness. . . . I'm shattered."248 Without adaption, this victim's life would
remain in a constant state of darkness and disintegration. Resisting
the process of adaptation would be an extremely costly choice. These
costs create constraints that are sufficiently severe that many people
choose to alter their commitments.
The process of hedonic adaptation also constrains the freedom to
choose a new set of commitments. The process of hedonic adaptation
is largely unconscious. "One of the hallmarks of the psychological im-
mune system is that it seems to work best when no one is watching,
and when its operations are explicitly scrutinized, it may cease func-
tioning altogether." 2 4 9 Nonetheless, tort victims exercise some con-
scious choice over how they adapt. For example, a person who must
compromise her ideal of living independently can choose which of
several types of assistance to seek out. A person who can no longer
run marathons can choose which of several other pursuits will best fit
her preinjury identity as an athlete. Thus, victims exhibit some au-
thorship over their postinjury selves. The key to understanding the
harms of self-altering injury, however, is to understand the set of op-
tions from which victims choose their new commitments. Although a
victim has more options when deciding how to adapt than deciding
whether to adapt, this exercise of agency is still constrained. Wejudge
how well our lives are going at least partially based on how well we live
up to our ideals, how much progress we are making toward our goals,
and how much we are satisfying our preferences. The process of he-
donic adaptation entails altering these commitments in such a way
that we can continue to say that our lives are going well. One's choice
of postinjury commitments is therefore constrained to the set of possi-
ble commitments that is consistent with such judgments. These con-
straints do violence to the idea of self-determination.250
248 Smith & Sparkes, supra note 9, at 619-20.
249 Gilbert et al., supra note 10, at 619. See generally WILSON, supra note 117, at 38-40
(explaining the "psychological immune system").
250 The preceding discussion should begin to show how the harms of self-altering in-
jury could be integrated into the capabilities approach: the freedom or opportunity to
maintain one's commitments is arguably a fundamental capability. Nussbaum lists Practi-
cal Reason as one of the two most important capabilities. NUSSBAUM, supra note 70, at 82.
Practical Reason includes "[b]eing able to form a conception of the good and to engage in
critical reflection about the planning of one's life." Id. at 79. The pressures of severe
physical disability do not reduce one's capacity or ability to form a conception of the good,
or reduce one's ability to critically reason. But Nussbaum uses her list to defend a minimal
threshold of freedom that all people deserve. Id. at 86. Given her focus on threshold
levels, it is not surprising that she phrases her explication of Practical Reason in terms of
being "able" to form a conception of the good. It seems fair to suggest that scholars should
interpret Practical Reason more broadly to encompass matters of degree. Thus one's free-
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D. Implications for Tort Damages
The thrust of this Article has been to introduce and defend the
concept of self-altering injury. A number of concerns will emerge if
legislators ultimately decide that damages for self-altering injuries are
appropriate. For example, we might ask whether it is better to mea-
sure self-altering injuries on a case-by-case basis, or instead make
broad rules that apply to actuarial classes of persons and injuries. This
concern is common to all aspects of tort damages, and other articles
address the tradeoffs involved with these decisions. This section will
therefore not address this issue. This section will also set aside for
future work other pragmatic issues of implementation. This section
will, however, briefly sketch the argument that self-altering injuries
can trigger tort damages under deterrence theories.251 It will then
argue that the phenomenon of hedonic adaptation, no matter how
robust, cannot justify the conclusion that tort awards are systematically
too high.
Once self-altering injuries are characterized as harms, the impli-
cations for deterrence theories are fairly straightforward. From an ef-
ficient deterrence perspective, the harms stemming from self-altering
injuries should be reflected in damage awards. The tortfeasor should
internalize harms in order to promote proper safety precautions. 252
The tort system could force the tortfeasor to pay these damages to the
government or to the victims themselves. 253 To the extent that victims
need additional incentives to sue tortfeasors, some or all of these pay-
ments should go to them regardless of whether these payments serve
any compensatory function. Of course, the actual measure of dam-
ages under any deterrence theory will be a function of numerous fac-
dom and opportunity to exercise practical reason (and choose a good life) is reduced
when some ideals, goals, and preferences are placed out of reach. Expanding the scope of
Practical Reason to include the freedom and opportunity to maintain one's conception of
the good would seem to be another appropriate interpretation. Taken together, this
would suggest that the freedom and opportunity to maintain one's commitments would be
a fundamental capability. Given the importance of self-determination, and the links be-
tween self-determination and the maintenance of commitments, it seems likely that an
"overlapping consensus" about the fundamental nature of this freedom could form. See
NUSSBAUM, supra note 77, at 79, 304-05.
One need not accept Nussbaum's list of fundamental capabilities, or accept the pro-
posed interpretation of Practical Reason above, to accept the viability of self-altering injury.
This explains why this Article has focused on developing the notion of self-altering injury
separately from the capabilities approach. All that is required is the (hopefully unobjec-
tionable) assertion that forced changes in one's commitments are harms.
251 This Article does not explore the implications of self-altering injuries for compen-
satory, corrective justice, and civil recourse theories of tort law. These issues are left for
future work.
252 See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF AccIDENT LAw 232-33, 298 (1987).
253 For a general discussion of decoupling compensatory recoveries from deterrence
payments, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives
for Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J. EcoN. 562, 566 (1991).
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tors such as the incentives and abilities of the victim and the tortfeasor
to take precautions. For purposes of this Section, however, it is suffi-
cient to note that the efficient deterrence rationale gives us at least a
prima facie reason to suspect that the tort system should award some
amount of damages for self-altering injuries.
Even if deterrence is the sole basis for awarding damages for self-
altering injuries, tort law should recognize claims for self-altering in-
jury. Ex ante, we are not indifferent to whether we suffer self-altering
injury. Nor should we be. Self-altering injuries constrain one's ability
to maintain a set of commitments. These constraints are harms. If
tort damages can reduce the incidence and severity of self-altering in-
juries by deterring risky conduct, then the tort system should force
tortfeasors to internalize these harms by paying damages.
If we accept that self-altering injuries occur and that a tort system
can recognize them, then two main implications follow. First, any tort
system that seeks to properly account for harm should recognize self-
altering injuries. The bulk of this Article has sought to define and
defend the claim that self-altering injuries exist. This section has ad-
ded to that claim by briefly sketching some thoughts as to why award-
ing damages for self-altering injuries is consistent with deterrence-
based justifications for tort damages. There is much theoretical and
pragmatic work that remains to be done to flesh out the details of how
tort law should respond to self-altering injuries. Nonetheless, the con-
cept of self-altering injury deserves the attention of tort scholars, and
deserves serious consideration as a category of tort damages.
Second, and more concretely, the relationship between hedonic
adaptation and self-alteration implies that to the extent that hedonic
adaptation exerts downward pressure on tort awards, the concept of
self-altering injury puts a corresponding upward pressure on those
awards. Thus hedonic adaptation, standing alone, does not show that
juries systematically overestimate the harms of severe disability. In-
deed, any claims of over- or underpayment become more difficult to
make because they require an assessment of both the degree to which
victims adapt and the degree to which this adaptation causes self-alter-
ation. As further research explores both hedonic adaptation and the
concept of self-altering injury, we may develop a better sense of the
relative magnitude of each of these forces. If the magnitude of harm
that self-alteration generates is similar to the magnitude of the he-
donic losses thereby avoided, then current jury awards may not be sys-
tematically biased by mispredictions of hedonic adaptation. In fact,
these jury awards may be roughly accurate. But here, the question of
magnitude is key, and unresolved. Current research supports only the
following claim: the phenomenon of hedonic adaptation, no matter
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how robust, cannot alone support the claim that tort awards are sys-
tematically too high.
CONCLUSION
Happiness research offers a powerful tool for analyzing the harms
that result from disability. However, this tool illuminates only part of
what matters for defining harm. Other legal scholars have sought to
defend the nonhedonic aspects of harm by adopting the capabilities
approach. This approach is incomplete. This Article provides an-
other account of the nonhedonic aspects of harm-one that is rooted
in the concept forced alterations of the self. In the context of debates
on happiness research and tort damages, this notion of self-altering
injury suggests that hedonic adaptation, standing alone, cannot sup-
port the claim that tort awards are likely to be too high. But it has
much more far-reaching implications as well; the concept of self-alter-
ing injury is useful even apart from the issues surrounding happiness
research and tort damages. Head injuries can cause forced alterations
of the self whether or not the injury ever affects the victims' happi-
ness. People do not hedonically adapt to chronic or degenerative dis-
eases, yet these diseases too can cause alterations of the self. The
concept of a forced alteration of the self is useful even beyond tort
law. For example, it might be able to assist proponents of group
rights. Here, it will be more natural to shift to the language of identity
rather than selves. Thus, proponents of group rights could argue that
groups should have the freedom to maintain their identity, and that
forced alterations of the groups' identity can constitute group harms.
These arguments are not pursued here. Rather this Article has used
happiness research and tort law as a useful background through
which to introduce and provide an initial defense of the claim that
forced alterations of the self can constitute harms. This claim de-
serves the attention of tort scholars and deserves serious consideration
as a category of tort damages.
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